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ABSTRACT
This article focuses on the Supreme Court's recent
enhancement of Rule 8(a)(2)'s pleading standard to approach the
heightened fraud pleading standards under Rule 9(b) and the Private
Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA). The authors posit that the
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introduction of a tacit "probability requirement" into the basic
pleading standard impedes the heightened fraud pleading standards
under Rule 9(b) and the PSLRA from fulfilling the policy rationales
for which they were created By elevating the basic requirements
that must be met in any federal civil case for a complaint to be
legally sufficient, the Supreme Court has caused an evident
convergence of pleading standards that blurs the lines between
pleading doctrines. The authors assert that this convergence
produces incongruity in the federal civil litigation system by at times
treating plaintiffs bringing fraud claims more leniently than those
alleging non-fraud claims under Rule 8(a)(2) 's new plausibility
pleading standard.
The modem rules of civil procedure permit defendants to
attack both the factual and legal sufficiency of a complaint.' Thanks
to the liberal "no set of facts" notice pleading standard adopted by
the United States Supreme Court in Conley v. Gibson,2 however,
Rule 12(b)(6) motions-asking the court to dismiss the complaint
"for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted" 3 -
were rarely granted by federal courts in civil litigation.4 As noted by
Justice Stevens, "[u]nder the relaxed pleading standards of the
Federal Rules, the idea was not to keep litigants out of court but
rather to keep them in."5 The Supreme Court, however, has recently
abandoned this liberal pleading standard in favor of plausibility
pleading, requiring plaintiffs to plead "enough facts to state a claim
to relief that is plausible on its face." 6 It is not surprising, therefore,
1. See generally Richard A. Epstein, Bell Atlantic v. Twombly: How
Motions to Dismiss Become (Disguised) Summary Judgments, 25 WASH. U. J.L. &
POL'Y 61, 62 (2007) (examining the legal and factual uncertainty under the present
federal rules and arguing that Twombly "was a disguised motion for summary
judgment that is best defended as properly balancing the relative error costs of
stopping too soon or going too far").
2. 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957).
3. FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
4. See, e.g., Test Masters Educ. Servs., Inc. v. Singh, 428 F.3d 559, 570 (5th
Cir. 2005) ("Motions to dismiss are viewed with disfavor and are rarely granted.");
Kingwood Oil Co. v. Bell, 204 F.2d 8, 13 (7th Cir. 1953) ("'Motions to dismiss
pleadings ... are to be granted sparingly and with caution."' (quoting CYCLOPEDIA
OF FEDERAL PROCEDURE § 15.204 (3d ed. 1951))).
5. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 575 (2007) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
6. Id. at 570.
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that complaints that would have previously survived motions to
dismiss under the notice pleading standard are now dismissed before
any opportunity for discovery.7
By enhancing the basic pleading standard applicable in every
federal civil case, the Supreme Court has elevated the previously
liberal Rule 8(a)(2) pleading standard to approach the heightened
pleading standards predicated on allegations of fraud-the Rule 9(b)
fraud pleading standard8 and the pleading standard for scienter in
securities fraud actions under the PSLRA.9  This evident
convergence of pleading standards blurs the lines between pleading
doctrines that were adopted to address different policy concerns, thus
creating a federal civil litigation system that is unfair and
incongruous.
Part I of this article briefly outlines the new Rule 8(a)(2)
plausibility pleading standard, as established under Twomblylo and
Iqbal; n the Rule 9(b) heightened fraud pleading standard; and the
PSLRA's pleading standard for scienter in securities fraud, as
interpreted in Tellabs.12 Part II posits that the enhanced Rule 8(a)(2)
pleading standard espoused by the Supreme Court in Twombly and
Iqbal converges with the heightened pleading standards under Rule
9(b) and the PSLRA. By comparing and contrasting the pleading
standards as understood by federal courts, analyzing Iqbal's
broadening of the Twombly pleading standard, and examining the
way in which plaintiffs are affected when opposing inferences have
equal weight, it will become apparent that recent Supreme Court
7. See Panther Partners, Inc. v. Ikanos Commc'ns, Inc., 347 F. App'x 617,
620 (2d Cir. 2009) (dismissing a complaint alleging violations of §§ 11, 12, and 15
of the Securities Act of 1933 because, applying Twombly's plausibility pleading
standard, the plaintiffs "did not allege facts sufficient to complete the chain of
causation needed to prove that defendants negligently made false statements").
8. See FED. R. Civ. P. 9(b) ("[I]n alleging fraud or mistake, a party must
state with particularity the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake.").
9. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4 (2006) ("[T]he complaint shall specify each
statement alleged to have been misleading.").
10. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 550-61 (setting forth the "plausibility standard" for
pleading conspiracy claims under § 1 of the Sherman Act).
11. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1953 (2009) (finding that the plaintiff
pleaded insufficient facts to state a claim for unlawful discrimination and
expanding the plausibility pleading standard to all federal civil claims).
12. Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 323 (2007)
(holding that courts must consider both fraudulent and non-fraudulent plausible
inferences of intent in determining whether a securities fraud complaint alleges
sufficient facts to meet the "strong inference" requirement under the PSLRA).
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decisions blur the lines distinguishing the pleading doctrines. Part
III discusses the consequences of this convergence, asserting that it
produces incongruity in the federal civil litigation system by at times
treating plaintiffs alleging fraud more leniently than those stating a
non-fraud claim under Rule 8(a)(2)'s plausibility pleading standard.
After briefly examining the different policy concerns behind each
pleading standard, Part III proposes that the Supreme Court, seeking
in part to deter vexatious litigation, engaged in judicial activism by
enhancing the basic pleading requirements for all federal civil suits
under Rule 8(a)(2) and failed to consider the repercussions of the
convergence of pleading standards, which has effectively
disadvantaged plaintiffs bringing forward claims not involving fraud.
I. THREE EVOLVING PLEADING STANDARDS: PLAUSIBILITY,
PARTICULARITY, AND COGENCY
The simple notice pleading standard adopted in Conley v.
Gibson has been abandoned in favor of plausibility pleading, as
established by the Supreme Court in Twombly and Iqbal.13 When
fraud is alleged in a complaint, however, the heightened pleading
requirements of Rule 9(b) must still be met. 14 And, in the case of
private securities litigation, after the Supreme Court's interpretation
of the PSLRA's pleading requirements in Tellabs, a securities fraud
complaint must allege plausible theories of relief through
particularized allegations, with the inference of scienter being cogent
and at least as compelling as any competing inference.15 In order to
properly discuss the convergence phenomenon proposed in Part II of
this article, these three pleading standards will be examined below.
A. Rule 8(a)(2) and the Death ofNotice Pleading: Bell
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly and Ashcroft v. Iqbal
Notice pleading, as understood by federal courts,
practitioners, and law students for over fifty years,16 has been
13. See discussion infra Part I.A.
14. See discussion infra Part I.B.
15. See discussion infra Part I.C.
16. See, e.g., Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 512 (2002)
(holding that an employment discrimination claim need not contain specific facts
[Vol. 30:14
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effectively overhauled by the U.S. Supreme Court through two
recent decisions.' 7  The Rule 8(a)(2) pleading standard was
embodied in the long accepted rule, established by the Supreme
Court in the 1957 decision Conley v. Gibson, "that a complaint
should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears
beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of
his claim which would entitle him to relief." 8 Even though the
simplified notice pleading standard adopted in Conley was
challenged by lower federal courts,19 this Supreme Court ruling
to establish a prima facie case, but rather "must simply 'give the defendant fair
notice of what the plaintiffs claim is and the grounds upon which it rests'
(quoting Conley v. Gibson, 335 U.S. 41, 47 (1957))); Judge v. City of Lowell, 160
F.3d 67, 72 (1st Cir. 1998) ("In an oft-quoted gloss, the Supreme Court stated over
forty years ago that a complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim
'unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in
support of his claim which would entitle him to relief."' (quoting Conley, 335 U.S.
at 45-46)); O'Mara v. Erie Lackawanna R.R. Co., 407 F.2d 674, 678 (2d Cir.
1969) (finding the dismissal of a portion of the complaint proper "because it did
not give defendants 'fair notice' of the basis of plaintiffs' claim under the
[Interstate Commerce] Act"); Garcia v. Bernabe, 289 F.2d 690, 692-93 (1st Cir.
1961) (finding the complaint sufficient under Conley and explaining that "[t]he
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not require that a claimant set out in detail the
facts upon which he bases his claim.").
17. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544 (2007).
18. Conley, 355 U.S. at 45-46.
19. See, e.g., Ascon Props., Inc. v. Mobil Oil Co., 866 F.2d 1149, 1155 (9th
Cir. 1989) ("[Conley] unfortunately provided conflicting guideposts."); Car
Carriers, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 745 F.2d 1101, 1106 (7th Cir. 1984) (explaining
that "Conley has never been interpreted literally" and finding that complaints
require "either direct or inferential allegations respecting all the material elements
necessary to sustain a recovery under some viable legal theory") (emphasis in
original); Christopher M. Fairman, Heightened Pleading, 81 TEX. L. REv. 551,
574-96 (2002) (examining federal cases embracing heightened pleading burdens
in contravention of Conley); Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., From Whom No Secrets Are
Hid, 76 TEX. L. REV. 1665, 1685 (1998) (noting that the problem with Rule 8(a)(2)
is its interpretation by federal courts and arguing that the Supreme Court "turned
Rule 8 on its head" in Conley); Richard L. Marcus, The Revival of Fact Pleading
Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 433, 463-65
(1986) (examining the tension between the notice pleading standard established in
Conley and subsequent interpretations of Rule 8(a)(2) by lower federal courts);
Matthew A. Josephson, Note, Some Things Are Better Left Said: Pleading Practice
After Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 42 GA. L. REv. 867, 881 (2008) ("[T]he
history of notice pleading can be characterized as a tug-of-war between the
Supreme Court and the lower federal courts, with the federal courts continually
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remained food law for fifty years.20 In Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly, however, the Supreme Court expressly overruled this
part of Conley's pleading standard in favor of a stricter plausibility
standard, holding that a complaint must provide "enough facts to
state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face."2 2 Although there
was some uncertainty about whether the Court's holding in Twombly
extended beyond the antitrust context,23 the Supreme Court resolved
that issue two years later in Ashcroft v. Iqbal,24 holding that the
plausibility standard extends beyond pleadings in the antitrust
context and encompasses all civil federal actions.
In 1938, the enactment of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure replaced the "cumbersome and inelegant" code pleading
requiring the pleading of more facts and the Supreme Court responding with a 'no
facts necessary' interpretation of Rule 8.").
20. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
21. 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
22. Id. at 570 (emphasis added).
23. Compare ATSI Commc'ns, Inc. v. Shaar Fund, Ltd., 493 F.3d 87, 98 n.2
(2d Cir. 2007) ("We have declined to read Twombly's flexible 'plausibility
standard' as relating only to antitrust cases."), and Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC
Mortg. Servicing Litig., 491 F.3d 638, 649 (7th Cir. 2007) ("The present case is
not an antitrust case, but the district court will want to determine whether the
complaint contains 'enough factual matter (taken as true)' to provide the minimum
notice of the plaintiffs' claim that the Court believes a defendant entitled to."),
with Aktieselskabet AF 21. Nov. 2001 v. Fame Jeans Inc., 525 F.3d 8, 15 (D.C.
Cir. 2008) ("Many courts have disagreed about the import of Twombly. We
conclude that Twombly leaves the long-standing fundamentals of notice pleading
intact."), and McZeal v. Sprint Nextel Corp., 501 F.3d 1354, 1356 n.4 (Fed. Cir.
2007) (refusing to apply Twombly to a patent infringement claim by arguing that
Twombly did not change the pleading requirement of Rule 8 as articulated in
Conley). See also Jason G. Gottesman, Speculating as to the Plausible: Pleading
Practice After Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 17 WIDENER L.J. 973, 1004-05
(2008) (noting how the circuit courts' disparate interpretations of Twombly are
confusing the legal profession); Douglas G. Smith, The Twombly Revolution?, 36
PEPP. L. REV. 1063, 1099 (2009) ("The full scope and effect of Twombly has yet to
play out in the courts. Nonetheless, faithful adherence to the Court's decision
would have potentially sweeping effects."); A. Benjamin Spencer, Plausibility
Pleading, 49 B.C. L. REV. 431, 494 (2008) ("The new plausibility standard, which
is being and will continue to be applied by lower courts outside the antitrust
context, bodes ill for plaintiffs who will now have to muster facts showing
plausibility when such facts may be unavailable to them.").
24. 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009).
25. Id. at 1953 (explaining that the Twombly decision "expounded the
pleading standard for 'all civil actions,' and it applies to antitrust and
discrimination suits alike").
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system and introduced a simplified pleading system, in which "the
complaint simply would initiate the action and notify the parties and
the court of its nature." 26 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2)
requires "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the
pleader is entitled to relief."27 It was not until 1957, in Conley v.
Gibson, however, that the Supreme Court interpreted the notice
pleading standard.28 In Conley, the Supreme Court interpreted the
language of Rule 8(a)(2) as requiring a plaintiff to "give the
defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon
which it rests." 29 Noting that Rule 8 did not require a plaintiff to
provide detailed facts, the Court rejected the view that pleading is
simply "a game of skill" 30 and found that the complaint at bar
adequately set forth a claim upon which relief could be granted.3 1
The Conley decision was long perceived as properly
embodying the drafters' original intent since it reflected the view that
"procedural rules should efficiently foster decisions on the merits."3 2
26. Spencer, supra note 23, at 434 (noting that the new rules introduced a
system in which "pleadings were no longer to be a substantial hurdle to be
overcome before plaintiffs could gain access to the courts"); see also Robert L.
Carter, Civil Procedure as a Vindicator of Civil Rights: The Relevance of Conley
v. Gibson in the Era of "Plausibility Pleading", 52 HOw. L.J. 17, 25 (2008) ("The
Rules were created, in part, to promote the resolution of lawsuits on the merits, not
on procedure. They replaced a cumbersome system that distinguished between
'ultimate facts' and 'evidentiary facts' or 'conclusions."').
27. FED. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2).
28. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47-48 (1957). The Supreme Court
refused to dismiss a complaint filed by a group of black railway employees against
their union because the complaint properly alleged that the union breached its
statutory duty of equal representation of its members. Id. at 45-46.
29. Id. at 47. The Court explained that this simplified form of pleading was
"made possible by the liberal opportunity for discovery and the other pretrial
procedures established by the Rules to disclose more precisely the basis of both
claim and defense and to define more narrowly the disputed facts and issues." Id.
at 47-48.
30. Id. at 48; see also Saritha Komatireddy Tice, A "Plausible" Explanation
of Pleading Standards: Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955 (2007),
31 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 827, 834 (2008) (explaining that because the pre-
Twombly interpretation of the Rules focused mainly on simplicity, federal courts
"enabled a plaintiff to state his claim without technical finesse").
31. Conley, 355 U.S. at 47.
32. See Carter, supra note 26, at 18 ("[The Conley decision] emphasized that
the Rules were designed to aid the enforcement of substantive justice rather than
create hypertechnical traps for the unwary, while serving dual purposes of
efficiency and fairness.").
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Moreover, as recently as 2002, in the employment discrimination
context, the Supreme Court reiterated that the notice pleadin
standard established in Conley still applied in all civil actions.
Nonetheless, as subsequent case law examined below will show, the
notice pleading standard has been abandoned in favor of a stricter
plausibility standard, in which the plaintiff must provide sufficient
factual allegations to move a claim across "the line between
possibility and plausibility." 34
In Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, decided in 2007, the U.S.
Supreme Court was presented with the issue of whether to dismiss an
antitrust conspiracy claim brought by a putative class of telephone
and internet service subscribers. 35 The subscriber-plaintiffs brought
their liability claim under § 1 of the Sherman Act, which prohibits
"[e]very contract, combination . . . or conspiracy, in restraint of trade
or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations." 36
The plaintiffs alleged that various regional telephone service
monopolies, called Incumbent Local Exchange Carriers (ILECs), had
engaged in a conspiracy to hinder the entrance of competing local
companies, referred to as Competitive Local Exchange Carriers
(CLECs), into the local telephone and internet service market.3 7
More specifically, they argued that the ILECs had conspired to
restrain trade by "'engag[ing] in parallel conduct' in their respective
service areas to inhibit the growth of upstart CLECs" and by entering
33. See Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 512 (2002) ("This
simplified notice pleading standard relies on liberal discovery rules and summary
judgment motions to define disputed facts and issues and to dispose of
unmeritorious claims."); see also Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 346
(2005) (relying on Conley to find that the plaintiffs' complaint failed to adequately
allege proximate causation and economic loss in a private federal securities fraud
action); Leatherman v. Tarrant Cnty. Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit,
507 U.S. 163, 167-68 (1993) (reaffirming the notice pleading standard established
in Conley in rejecting the application of a heightened pleading standard to a Fourth
Amendment civil rights case alleging municipal liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983).
34. Bell Ati. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 557 (2007).
35. Id. at 548-49.
36. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006). Section I of the Sherman Act only prohibits
restraints of trade "effected by a contract, combination, or conspiracy."
Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 775 (1984). "The
crucial question," therefore, is whether the alleged anticompetitive actions stem
from "independent decision or from an agreement, tacit or express." Theatre
Enterprises., Inc. v. Paramount Film Distrib. Corp., 346 U.S. 537, 540 (1954).
37. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 550-51.
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into agreements not to compete against each other.3 8 These actions,
the subscribers alleged, resulted in them having to pay inflated rates
for the services provided.39
The District Court for the Southern District of New York
dismissed the complaint, finding that the subscribers' "allegations of
parallel ILEC actions to discourage competition" were inadequate
because mere "conscious parallelism" was insufficient to state a
claim of conspiracy under § 1 of the Sherman Act.40 Furthermore, as
to the alleged non-compete agreements, the district court found that
they were insufficient to infer a conspiracy because the complaint
failed to allege facts to suggest that "refraining from competing in
other territories as CLECs was contrary to [the ILECs'] apparent
economic interests." 41 The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
reversed, however, holding that "plus factors are not required to be
pleaded to permit an antitrust claim based on parallel conduct to
survive dismissal."4 2 The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari in
order to determine the proper pleading standard for antitrust
conspiracy cases based upon allegations of parallel conduct.43
The Supreme Court began its analysis by noting that a
plaintiff bringing an antitrust conspiracy claim may not proceed by
38. Id. at 550. The complaint alleged the following:
In the absence of any meaningful competition between the [ILECs] in one
another's markets, and in light of the parallel course of conduct that each
engaged in to prevent competition from CLECs within their respective
local telephone and/or high speed internet services markets and the other
facts and market circumstances alleged above, Plaintiffs allege upon
information and belief that [the ILECs] have entered into a contract,
combination or conspiracy to prevent competitive entry in their respective
local telephone and/or high speed internet services markets and have
agreed not to compete with one another and otherwise allocated
customers and markets to one another.
Id. at 551.
39. Id. at 550.
40. Id. at 552. Judge Lynch, presiding over the district court, explained that
"parallel action is a common and often legitimate phenomenon, because similar
market actors with similar information and economic interests will often reach the
same business decisions." Twombly v. Bell Atl. Corp., 313 F. Supp. 2d 174, 179
(S.D.N.Y. 2003), rev'd, 425 F.3d 99 (2d Cir. 2005), rev'd sub nom. Bell Atl. Corp.
v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
41. Twombly, 313 F. Supp. 2d at 188.
42. Twombly, 425 F.3d at 114.
43. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 553.
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merely providing evidence of parallel conduct, but rather must
provide evidence that properly rules out the possibility of
independent action by the defendants.44 In determining whether the
subscribers' complaint had sufficiently pleaded antitrust conspiracy,
the majority focused on the notice pleading system established under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), as described in Conley.45
Nonetheless, the Court reasoned that factual allegations that would
sufficiently "raise a right to relief above the speculative level" were
required, rejecting the view that "a formulaic recitation of the
elements of a cause of action" would be sufficient.46 Thus, in
holding that a claim under § 1 of the Sherman Act requires a
complaint that pleads enough facts to allege that there was an
agreement, the Court noted:
Asking for plausible grounds to infer an agreement
does not impose a probability requirement at the
pleading stage; it simply calls for enough fact[s] to
raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will
reveal evidence of illegal agreement. And, of course,
a well-pleaded complaint may proceed even if it
strikes a savvy judge that actual proof of those facts is
improbable, and "that a recovery is very remote and
unlikely."4 7
Interestingly, in agreeing with the district court's finding that
the subscribers failed to state a claim under § 1 of the Sherman Act
because the facts alleged did not sufficiently suggest antitrust
44. Id. at 554 ("The inadequacy of showing parallel conduct or
interdependence, without more, mirrors the ambiguity of the behavior: consistent
with conspiracy, but just as much in line with a wide swath of rational and
competitive business strategy unilaterally prompted by common perceptions of the
market.").
45. Id. at 554-55.
46. Id. at 555. The majority was mainly concerned about the possibility of
excessive discovery costs: "[I]t is one thing to be cautious before dismissing an
antitrust complaint in advance of discovery, but quite another to forget that
proceeding to antitrust discovery can be expensive." Id. at 558; see also Tice,
supra note 30, at 830 ("[Twombly] reflects a significant shift away from the
litigation-promoting mindset embodied in Conley and instead solidifies what has
been a growing hostility towards litigation.").




conspiracy, the Supreme Court emphasized that it was neither
applying a heightened pleading standard nor attempting to "broaden
the scope of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9.,48 More specifically,
the Court explained that it did "not require heightened fact pleading
of specifics, but only enough facts to state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face," and that the subscribers' complaint had to be
dismissed because they failed to "nudge[] their claims across the linefrom conceivable to plausible."49
Two years later, in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, the U.S. Supreme Court
decidedly resolved the question as to whether this stricter plausibilit
standard applied in civil cases generally or only in antitrust cases.
Javaid Iqbal, a Pakistani Muslim, claimed to have been deprived of
his constitutional rights after being arrested on criminal charges in
the wake of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. 1 Because
Iqbal was deemed to be of "high interest" by the FBI, he was held in
a maximum security housing unit and, after pleading guilty to
criminal fraud and conspiracy charges, was removed to his native
country.52 Iqbal then filed a Bivens complaint against Attorney
General John Ashcroft and FBI Director Robert Mueller, alleging
that the policies adopted by Ashcroft and Mueller unconstitutionally
discriminated against him while he was detained.53 After the District
Court for the Eastern District of New York refused to grant the
defendants' motion to dismiss, Mueller and Ashcroft filed an
interlocutory appeal to the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.54
48. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 569 n.14 ("Here, our concern is not that the
allegations in the complaint were insufficiently 'particular[ized]'; rather, the
complaint warranted dismissal because it failed in toto to render plaintiffs'
entitlement to relief plausible.").
49. Id at 570 (emphasis added).
50. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1953 (2009).
51. Id. at 1942. More specifically, lqbal contended that he was invidiously
discriminated against in contravention of the First and Fifth Amendments to the
United States Constitution. Id. at 1944.
52. Id. at 1943.
53. Id. at 1943-44. A Bivens action is "an implied private action for damages
against federal officers alleged to have violated a citizen's constitutional rights."
Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 66 (2001) (examining Bivens v. Six
Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971)); see also Ryan D.
Newman, From Bivens to Malesko and Beyond: Implied Constitutional Remedies
and the Separation of Powers, 85 TEX. L. REv. 471, 476 (2006) (explaining
Bivens's doctrine of implied constitutional damage remedies and arguing that it
does not violate separation of powers principles).
54. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1944.
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Concluding that the flexible plausibility standard established in
Twombly "obliges a pleader to amplify a claim with some factual
allegations in those contexts where such amplification is needed to
render the claim plausible," the court found Iqbal's pleading
adequate since it did not involve one of those contexts where
amplification was required.55
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether
sufficient facts were pleaded under the Rule 8 plausibility standard
for a complaint stating a claim of purposeful and unlawful
discrimination to survive dismissal.56 Examining Twombly's
analysis of the plausibility standard under Rule 8(a)(2), the Supreme
Court explained that, even though "detailed factual allegations" are
not necessary, the Rule 8(a)(2) pleading standard requires "more
than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me
accusation."57 The Court then examined the factual allegations and
determined that they failed to "plausibly suggest an entitlement to
relief," since the complaint did not contain facts that would allow the
Court to plausibly conclude that the defendants "purposefully
adopted a policy of classifying post-September 11 detainees as 'of
high interest' because of their race, religion, or national origin." In
the end, the Supreme Court not only found that Iqbal's complaint
failed to nudge his claims "across the line from conceivable to
plausible," but also explicitly clarified that Twombly's pleading
standard applied to both antitrust and discrimination suits alike, since
that decision was primarily based on properly interpreting Rule 8.
Thus, Iqbal not only expanded the scope of the Rule 8(a)(2)
plausibility standard proposed in Twombly, but also "changed the
55. Iqbal v. Hasty, 490 F.3d 143, 157-58 (2d Cir. 2007), rev'd sub nom.
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009).
56. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1942-43.
57. Id. at 1949.
58. Id. at 1951-52 (noting that all the complaint plausibly suggests is "that
the Nation's top law enforcement officers, in the aftermath of a devastating
terrorist attack, sought to keep suspected terrorists in the most secure conditions
available until the suspects could be cleared of terrorist activity," which was
insufficient for a court to properly infer that defendants had purposely adopted an
invidiously discriminatory policy).
59. Id. at 1951, 1953 ("Though Twombly determined the sufficiency of a
complaint sounding in antitrust, the decision was based on our interpretation and
application of Rule 8. That Rule in turn governs the pleading standard 'in all civil
actions and proceedings in the United States district courts."' (quoting FED. R. CIV.
P. 1)).
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landscape for Rule 12(b)(6) motions." 60
The liberal notice pleading standard established in Conley,
therefore, is now obsolete.61 In the wake of Twombly and Iqbal,
lower federal courts must decipher the scope and reach of the
plausibility pleading standard in every civil case. 62  As will be
examined later in the article, the problem becomes more acute once
the enhanced Rule 8(a)(2) pleading standard is compared and
contrasted to the Rule 9(b) heightened fraud pleading standard and
the PSLRA's scienter pleading standard for securities fraud. And, as
will be discussed, the new Rule 8(a)(2) plausibility standard
converges with the two heightened pleading standards predicated on
allegations of fraud.63
B. Rule 9(b) and the "Heightened" Fraud Pleading
Standard
Unlike Rule 8(a)(2), which requires "a short and plain
60. Robert L. Rothman, Twombly and Iqbal: A License to Dismiss, LITIG.,
Spring 2009, at 1, 2; see also id. at 1-2 ("[U]nder the guise of explaining the
concept of 'plausibility' first announced in Twombly, the Court imposed a
gatekeeper-type duty on the district court that applies even if the allegations of the
complaint are well pleaded and thus assumed to be true.").
61. See id. at I ("[A]t a minimum, it seems fair to conclude that Conley is not
merely retired, it is dead and buried."); Spencer, supra note 23, at 431 ("Notice
pleading is dead. Say hello to plausibility pleading.").
62. See, e.g., Amber A. Pelot, Note, Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly: Mere
Adjustment or Stringent New Requirement in Pleading?, 59 MERCER L. REv. 1371,
1379 (2008) (noting that, except for the heightened pleading standards of Rule 9
and the PSLRA, "the Supreme Court has insisted, and still maintains in Bell
Atlantic Corp., that the more forgiving standard of pleading Rule 8(a)(2) is to
apply transubstantively to all other types of claims.").
63. See discussion infra Part II. Moreover, those state courts that had their
procedural systems modeled after the Conley pleading standard and the Federal
Rules must now determine whether to move towards the new plausibility standard
to maintain procedural uniformity. See Z. W. Julius Chen, Following the Leader:
Twombly, Pleading Standards, and Procedural Uniformity, 108 COLUM. L. REv.
1431, 1432 (2008) ("[A] state should not abandon Conley simply to preserve
uniformity between state and federal interpretations of Rules 8(a) and 12(b)(6).");
see also Andr6e Sophia Blumstein, Twombly gets Iqbal-ed: An Update on the New
Federal-and Tennessee?-Pleading Standard, TENN. B.J., July 2009, at 23, 23
("Twombly, of course, controls only federal litigation, but its influence will likely
come to be felt in state civil litigation as well."). This issue, however, is beyond
the scope of this article.
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statement of the claim" when pleading in a civil action,64 Rule 9(b)
requires the circumstances of an alleged fraud or mistake to be plead
with particularity.6 5 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b) states: "In
alleging fraud or mistake, a party must state with particularity the
circumstances constituting fraud or mistake. Malice, intent,
knowledge, and other conditions of a person's mind may be alleged
generally." 66
The term "generally," however, as discussed by the Supreme
Court in Iqbal, is relative; to be properly understood, the term must
be compared to the particularity requirement of the first sentence of
Rule 9(b).67 Specifically, averments such as the time, place, identity
of theparties, and nature of the fraud or mistake must be pleaded in
detail. Pleading with absolute particularity, however, is not
required by the federal rules. Rather, a balance must be reached
between the purported simplicity of Rule 8 and the particularity that
Rule 9 demands. 69 As explained by the majority opinion in Iqbal, in
the invidious discrimination context, "Rule 9 merely excuses a party
from pleading discriminatory intent under an elevated pleading
standard. It does not give him license to evade the less rigid-though
still operative-strictures of Rule 8.",70 Therefore, even when the
Rule 9(b) heightened pleading standard is inapplicable because
neither fraud nor mistake is alleged, the complaint must nonetheless
meet the basic requirements of the Rule 8(a)(2) plausibility standard,
64. FED. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2).
65. FED. R. Civ. P. 9(b).
66. Id.
67. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1954 (2009).
68. 5 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE
AND PROCEDURE § 1241 (3d ed. 2009); see also DiLeo v. Ernst & Young, 901
F.2d 624, 627 (7th Cir. 1990) ("Although states of mind may be pleaded generally,
the 'circumstances' must be pleaded in detail. This means the who, what, when,
where, and how: the first paragraph of any newspaper story.").
69. See WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 68, § 1298 ("[T]he rule regarding the
pleading of fraud does not require absolute particularity or a recital of the
evidence, especially when some matters are beyond the knowledge of the pleader
and can only be developed through discovery."). It has also been argued, however,
that Twombly's plausibility standard rejects the generalized pleading suggested by
the second sentence of Rule 9(b). See Spencer, supra note 23, at 474 ("Any
standard that requires 'more than labels and conclusions' and explicitly calls for
the pleading of suggestive facts supporting legal assertions such as the existence of
an unlawful agreement or conspiracy fails to permit matters to be averred
generally.").
70. lqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1954.
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as established by Twombly and Iqbal. 1
The Rule 9(b) heightened pleading standard-more
specifically, the pleading fraud with particularity requirement-is
aimed primarily at avoiding groundless lawsuits, safeguarding one's
reputation, and supplying defendants with sufficient information in
the complaint to allow them to prepare a proper defense.72 But, as
observed by the Supreme Court, some argue that Rule 9(b)'s
standard rarely achieves these objectives: "In the absence of [an
amendment to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure], federal courts
and litigants must rely on summary judgment and control of
discovery to weed out unmeritorious claims sooner rather than
later."73  This view of Rule 9(b)'s heightened pleading standard,
however, may be disputed; the Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit, for example, generally gives a strict interpretation to the
Rule 9(b) heightened pleading standard, regularly dismissing
complaints alleging fraud that fail to plead fraud with particularity.
71. See, e.g., Richard D. Bernstein & Frank M. Scaduto, Court Toughens
Application of Rule 8 Pleading Standards for Civil Cases, N.Y. L.J., July 6, 2009,
at 4 ("[T]he heightened pleading standards of Iqbal/Twombly apply to allegations
of all elements of a claim, including knowledge and intent. [The holding in Iqbal]
expressly applies even when Rule 9(b) is inapplicable because the plaintiff has not
alleged fraud.").
72. WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 68, § 1296.
73. Leatherman v. Tarrant Cnty. Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit,
507 U.S. 163, 168-169 (1993) (holding that a "heightened pleading standard,"
more stringent than the Rule 8(a)(2) standard, was not required of complaints
alleging municipal liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983); see also WRIGHT & MILLER,
supra note 68, § 1296 ("Rule 9(b) motions often yield no more than litigation
delays or slightly amended complaints, and plaintiffs may not be deterred by the
rule from instituting an action on the basis of information that may prove to be
insufficiently particular."). Revising or amending the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, however, would also involve several difficulties. See, e.g., Carter,
supra note 26, at 20 (arguing that caseload management at the federal court level
would be preferable to outright revision of the Rules). "[R]evision of the Rules or
their interpretation cannot spring from political attempts to undercut certain classes
of individuals who rely solely on the federal courts to vindicate their substantive
rights. Modifying the Rules for sociopolitical purposes would be inconsistent with
the drafters' intent." Id.
74. As recently as 2009, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
explained that claims of fraud under Rule 9(b) may be based neither on speculation
nor conclusory allegations, mainly supporting its position on Rule 9(b)'s threefold
purpose: "to provide a defendant with fair notice of a plaintiff's claim, to safeguard
a defendant's reputation from improvident charges of wrongdoing, and to protect a
defendant against the institution of a strike suit." Wood ex rel. U.S. v. Applied
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Commentators have also criticized application of the Rule
9(b) heightened fraud pleading standard in cases of securities fraud.
Plaintiffs in securities fraud cases are unlikely to have firsthand
knowledge of the details involved in a fraudulent transaction, since
that kind of information is generally unavailable from public
documents, thus making it problematic for these plaintiffs to plead
fraud with the particularity required under Rule 9(b).76 Nonetheless,
as will be examined below, the enactment of the PSLRA by
Congress, in an attempt to prevent abusive fraud-based shareholder
lawsuits, further enhanced the pleading standards for scienter in
securities fraud cases.
C. The PSLRA and the Pleading Standard for Scienter in
Securities Fraud: Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues &
Rights, Ltd.
Prior to 1995, any securities complaint that included
allegations regarding a defendant's state of mind only had to meet
the generality requirement under the second sentence of Rule 9(b),
while complaints alleging securities fraud had to meet Rule 9(b)'s
particularity requirement. Prompted by the perception that abusive
Research Assocs., Inc., 328 F. App'x 744, 747 (2d Cir. 2009) (quoting O'Brien v.
Nat'1 Prop. Analysts Partners, 936 F.2d 674, 676 (2d Cir. 1991) (dismissing a
complaint under the False Claims Act because it lacked the particulars required to
support the fraud claim)); see also Wexner v. First Manhattan Corp., 902 F.2d 169,
172 (2d Cir. 1990) (dismissing a securities fraud complaint for failure to plead
fraud with particularity and noting that, "[a]lthough scienter need not be alleged
with great specificity, plaintiffs are still required to plead the factual basis which
gives rise to a 'strong inference' of fraudulent intent").
75. See, e.g., Richard G. Himelrick, Pleading Securities Fraud, 43 MD. L.
REV. 342, 378 (1984) ("While there have undoubtedly been many frivolous
securities claims, attempting to deter such claims through specialized pleading that
is enforced through dismissal and denial of discovery is in conflict with the intent
and format of the federal scheme of pleading."); Note, Pleading Securities Fraud
Claims with Particularity under Rule 9(b), 97 HARV. L. REv. 1432, 1432-33
(1984) ("The courts' mechanical application of rule 9(b) to claims brought under
investor-protection statutes illustrates their failure to resolve the conflict between
the philosophy of notice pleading embodied in rule 8 and the heightened pleading
standard of rule 9(b).").
76. Note, Pleading Securities Fraud Claims with Particularity under Rule
9(b), supra note 75, at 1436-37.
77. See Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 319
(2007) ("Prior to the enactment of the PSLRA, the sufficiency of a complaint for
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practices were rampant in private securities litigation, however,
Congress decided to enact reforms to deter frivolous litigation while
maintaining confidence in the nation's capital markets.78 As noted in
the House Conference Report, Congress had acquired evidence of
various forms of abusive litigation practices: routine lawsuits
whenever stock prices changed significantly, the "targeting of deep
pocket defendants," abusive use of costly discovery requests to
encourage settlements, and client manipulation by class-action
lawyers.79 Due to these abusive practices committed in private
securities litigation, innocent parties were reportedly being forced to
pay exorbitant settlements and qualified people were unwilling to
serve in directorial positions for fear of baseless lawsuits.so Thus, in
1995, Congress passed the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act
(PSLRA),81 which implemented various procedural protections to
curtail frivolous securities lawsuits.82
Among the new measures was the imposition of heightened
requirements for the pleading of scienter in private securities
litigation:
In any private action arising under this chapter in
securities fraud was governed not by Rule 8, but by the heightened pleading
standard set forth in Rule 9(b)."); see also Thomas F. Gillespie III, Note, Dura
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Broudo: A Missed Opportunity to Right the Wrongs in the
PSLRA and Rebalance the Private Rule 1Ob-5 Litigation Playing Field, 3 J. Bus.
& TECH. L. 161, 167 (2008) ("Generally speaking, federal civil actions are
governed by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure .... However, in 1995 Congress
passed the PSLRA, which, among other measures, created heightened pleading
requirements in federal securities fraud actions under Rule lOb-5.").
78. H.R. REP. No. 104-369, at 26 (1995) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1995
U.S.C.C.A.N. 730.
79. Id. at 31.
80. Id. at 32.
81. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4 (2006).
82. Patrick Berarducci & Larry J. Obhof, Keeping Current: Securities
Supreme Court Clarifies Scienter Pleadings, Bus. L. TODAY, Nov.-Dec. 2007, at
10, 10. Some of the most important substantive and procedural controls imposed
by the PSLRA include "procedures for appointment of lead plaintiffs and lead
counsel, limitations on damages and attorney fees, a statutory 'safe harbor' for
defendants' forward-looking statements, a stay of discovery pending a motion to
dismiss, and mandatory sanctions for frivolous lawsuits." Id.; see also MARC 1.
STEINBERG, SECuRITIEs REGULATION 442-45, 488-89 (rev. 5th ed. 2009)
(examining the changes imposed by the PSLRA regarding the safe harbor for
certain forward-looking statements and the PSLRA's effect on issues relating to
contribution and proportionate liability).
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which the plaintiff may recover money damages only
on proof that the defendant acted with a particular
state of mind, the complaint shall, with respect to
each act or omission alleged to violate this chapter,
state with particularity facts giving rise to a strong
inference that the defendant acted with the required
state of mind.
Based in part on the language of the Second Circuit's
pleading standard-"the most stringent pleading standard" 84 -and
Rule 9(b)'s particularity requirement for pleading fraud, the
PSLRA's scienter pleading standard was intended to create
uniformity among the circuit courts. Congress, however, failed to
provide guidance regarding the proper interpretation of "strong
inference," which led to confusion among lower federal courts trying
to determine what facts and circumstances would be sufficient to
find a strong inference of scienter.86 Ultimately, the circuits adopted
83. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2) (2006). This heightened pleading standard,
however, only applies in private litigation; enforcement actions by the Securities
and Exchange Commission are not required to meet the additional pleading
requirements established under the PSLRA. See id. § 78u-4(a)(1) (stating the
PSLRA "shall apply in each private action arising under this chapter that is
brought as a plaintiff class action. . . .") (emphasis added).
84. H.R. REP. NO. 104-369, at 41. Even prior to the enactment of the PSLRA,
the Second Circuit required plaintiffs "to allege facts that give rise to a strong
inference of fraudulent intent." Shields v. Citytrust Bancorp., Inc., 25 F.3d 1124,
1127-28 (2d Cir. 1994) (noting that a complaint making securities fraud
allegations under § 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 must "(1) specify the statements that the
plaintiff contends were fraudulent, (2) identify the speaker, (3) state where and
when the statements were made, and (4) explain why the statements were
fraudulent").
85. H.R. REP. No. 104-369, at 41 (explaining that the federal courts of
appeals had "interpreted Rule 9(b)'s requirement in conflicting ways, creating
distinctly different standards among the circuits").
86. Compare Friedberg v. Discreet Logic Inc., 959 F. Supp. 42, 49-50 (D.
Mass. 1997) (holding that pleading a strong inference of scienter under the PSLRA
requires setting forth "specific facts that constitute strong circumstantial evidence
of conscious behavior by defendants"), with Marksman Partners, L.P. v. Chantal
Pharm. Corp., 927 F. Supp. 1297, 1309 (C.D. Cal. 1996) (finding that recklessness
is sufficient to plead scienter because, although in certain specified situations the
PSLRA requires "actual knowledge," the higher standard applies only in expressly
specified situations). See also The Supreme Court, 2006 Term-Leading Cases,
121 HARv. L. REv. 385, 385 (2007) [hereinafter The Supreme Court] (noting that
even though uniformity was one of the objectives of the PSLRA's pleading
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differing standards. Twelve years after the enactment of the
PSLRA, the Supreme Court finally resolved the circuit split in
Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd.,8 a decision that had
been long-awaited by both the lower federal courts and
practitioners.9
Tellabs was a manufacturer of specialized equipment used in
fiber optic networks and, during the relevant time period, Richard
standard for scienter in securities litigation, "it instead produced disarray among
the circuit courts over how high Congress intended to set the bar for pleading
scienter"); Laura R. Smith, Comment, The Battle Between Plain Meaning and
Legislative History: Which Will Decide the Standard for Pleading Scienter After
the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995?, 39 SANTA CLARA L. REV.
577, 579 (1999) (examining the controversy that arose among courts regarding the
various interpretations given to PSLRA's scienter pleading standard based on the
PSLRA's plain meaning and its legislative history).
87. See, e.g., Geoffrey P. Miller, Pleading After Tellabs, 2009 Wis. L. REV.
507, 509-10 (2009) (stating different interpretations of "strong inference" among
circuits); John M. Wunderlich, Note, Tellabs v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd.: The
Weighing Game, 39 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 613, 623-26 (2008) (same). The First
Circuit adopted the view that the strong inference test is not met where, "viewed in
light of the complaint as a whole, there are legitimate explanations for the behavior
that are equally convincing." In re Credit Suisse First Boston Corp., 431 F.3d 36,
48-49 (1st Cir. 2005). The Sixth Circuit, for example, took a different approach,
permitting allegations of scienter to survive motions to dismiss only where they
constituted the "most plausible" of the competing inferences. Fidel v. Farley, 392
F.3d 220, 227 (6th Cir. 2004). The Seventh Circuit, on the other hand, would only
allow complaints to survive the Rule 12(b)(6) motion if they alleged "facts from
which, if true, a reasonable person could infer that the defendant acted with the
required intent." Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd. v. Tellabs Inc., 437 F.3d 588, 602
(7th Cir. 2006), vacated, 551 U.S. 308 (2007).
88. 551 U.S. 308 (2007).
89. The widely-anticipated Supreme Court decision settled the standard for
pleading a "strong inference" of scienter under the PSLRA and resolved the split
among the circuits on this important legal issue. See id. at 317-18, 322-26
(acknowledging circuit split and adopting a uniform standard); James D. Cox,
Randall S. Thomas & Lynn Bai, Do Differences in Pleading Standards Cause
Forum Shopping in Securities Class Actions?: Doctrinal and Empirical Analyses,
2009 Wis. L. REv. 421, 434 (2009) (noting that the Supreme Court decision in
Tellabs had been "anticipated, and eagerly so, in many quarters," and arguing that
the circuits nonetheless maintained disparate interpretations of the scienter
pleading standard under the PSLRA); Steven Wolowitz & Joseph De Simone, Did
'Tellabs' Raise PSLRA Scienter Bar?, N.Y. L.J., Dec. 3, 2007, at S3 (noting that
Tellabs "was among the most anticipated opinions of the past Supreme Court
term," with its framework being widely applied by lower federal courts in the five
months after the decision was issued).
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Notebaert was the company's chief executive officer and president. 90
Shareholder-plaintiffs alleged that they had been induced to buy
artificially inflated stock by false statements knowingly made by
Notebaert and other executive officers. 91 The shareholders brought a
class action under § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
(the Exchange Act) and SEC Rule 1Ob-5 in the District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois. 92  Finding that the plaintiffs'
"conclusory allegations regarding Notebaert d[id] not create a strong
inference that he acted with the requisite state of mind under the
90. Tellabs, 551 U.S. at 314.
91. Johnson v. Tellabs, Inc., 303 F. Supp. 2d 941, 946, 950 (N.D. Ill. 2004),
aff'd in part, rev'd in part sub nom. Makor Issues & Rights v. Tellabs, 437 F.3d
588 (7th Cir. 2006), vacated, 551 U.S. 308 (2007). More specifically, the
plaintiffs alleged that defendants "made a series of false statements and omissions
regarding Tellabs' fourth quarter 2000 financials, Tellabs' products, and its future
projects that resulted in the artificial inflation of Tellabs' stock price." Johnson,
303 F. Supp. 2d at 946. The Supreme Court only focused on the allegations
relating to Notebaert, however, because the claims against the other executives had
already been dismissed and therefore were not before the Court. Tellabs, 551 U.S.
at 315 n.l.
92. Johnson, 303 F. Supp. 2d at 950. Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act
prohibits the "use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any
security . . . [of] any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in
contravention of such rules and regulations as the [SEC] may prescribe as
necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors."
15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2006). SEC Rule lOb-5 implements § 10(b) by providing that:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of
any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of
any facility of any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light
of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates
or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with
the purchase or sale of any security.
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2010). Furthermore, the Supreme Court has
recognized an implied private right of action for sellers or purchasers of securities
injured by a violation of § 10(b). Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 341
(2005); see also MARC 1. STEINBERG, UNDERSTANDING SECURITES LAW § 8.01
(5th ed. 2009) (examining the elements of a private lOb-5 claim); Jerod Neas,
Dura Duress: The Supreme Court Mandates a More Rigorous Pleading and Proof
Requirement for Loss Causation Under Rule JOb-5 Class Actions, 78 U. COLO. L.
REV. 347, 351-57 (2007) (same).
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PSLRA," the district court dismissed the complaint. 93 The Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, however, reversed in relevant part.94
After examining the positions taken by other circuit courts, the
Seventh Circuit held that a complaint would survive a Rule 12(b)(6)
motion to dismiss if "it alleges facts from which, if true, a reasonable
person could infer that the defendant acted with the required
intent."95  Applying this reasonable person standard, the Seventh
Circuit found that the facts alleged in the complaint met the
PSLRA's threshold with regard to Notebaert; since he was acting
within the scope of his role as chief executive officer, the alleged
knowledge of the falsity of Notebaert's statements was also imputed
upon Tellabs.9 6
In 2007, the U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari in order
"to prescribe a workable construction of the 'strong inference'
standard" and finally solve the split among the federal courts of
appeals. 97 The Court began by interpreting the PSLRA heightened
pleading standard as requiring a plaintiff to plead "with particularity
both the facts constituting the alleged violation, and the facts
evidencing scienter, i.e., the defendant's intention 'to deceive,
manipulate, or defraud.',,98 Rejecting the Seventh Circuit's "broader
and more plaintiff-friendly" interpretation of "strong inference," 99
the majority found that a comparative evaluation was required: a
court must consider not only the inferences provided by the plaintiff,
"but also competing inferences rationally drawn from the facts
alleged."100 The Court explained:
An inference of fraudulent intent may be plausible,
yet less cogent than other, nonculpable explanations
for the defendant's conduct. To qualify as "strong"
within the intendment of [the PSLRA], we hold, an
93. Johnson, 303 F. Supp. 2d at 969.
94. Makor Issues & Rights Ltd. v. Tellabs, Inc. (Tellabs II), 437 F.3d 588,
602 (7th Cir. 2006) (rejecting the position taken by the Sixth Circuit).
95. Id.
96. Id. at 603.
97. Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 322 (2007).
98. Id. at 313 (quoting Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 194 n.12
(1976)).
99. See Wolowitz & De Simone, supra note 89, at S3 (examining the holding
in Tellabs and discussing various questions left unanswered by the Supreme
Court).
100. Tellabs, 551 U.S. at 314.
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inference of scienter must be more than merely
plausible or reasonable-it must be cogent and at
least as compelling as any opposing inference of
nonfraudulent intent.101
After so holding, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded
to the Seventh Circuit, which later found that the shareholder-
plaintiffs had successfully pleaded scienter as required under the
PSLRA.102
Although decided prior to Tellabs, another relevant U.S.
Supreme Court decision interpreting the pleading requirements for a
§ 10(b) claim-and also providing insight into the Supreme Court's
later reasoning in Twombly and Iqbal'0 -is Dura Pharmaceuticals,
Inc. v. Bruodo.104 Between April 1997 and February 1998, Michael
Bruodo and other class members bought stock of Dura
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (Dura), a company dedicated to marketing
101. Id.
102. Makor Issues & Rights Ltd v. Tellabs, Inc. (Tellabs II), 513 F.3d 702
(7th Cir. 2008). The Seventh Circuit interpreted Tellabs as a two-prong test: "first
the inference must be cogent, and second it must be as cogent as the opposing
inference, that is, the inference of lack of scienter." Id. at 705. The court began
with the second prong and rejected the opposing inference-that the misstatements
were the product of "merely careless mistakes"-as "exceedingly unlikely." Id. at
709. Then it moved to the first prong-whether the inference was cogent-and
found that the plaintiff s hypothesis was cogent because defendant's explanation of
the occurrences was "far less likely than the hypothesis of scienter." Id at 711;
see also John P. Stigi III & Martin White, Courts Interpret 'Tellabs': They Appear
to View Case as Heightening Standard for Pleading Scienter, NAT'L L.J, Mar. 17,
2008, at Si, S4 (examining the Seventh Circuit's holding and noting that "[Judge]
Posner in [Tellabs 17] addressed the sufficiency of the plaintiff's confidential
source allegations only after reaching his conclusions regarding the comparative
strength of the opposing inferences, [thus] effectively collapsing the first prong of
the Tellabs test into the second prong").
103. See discussion infra Part II.A-C (discussing the effects of the new
plausibility standard established in Twombly and Iqbal); see also Steven R.
Paradise & Ari M. Berman, Pleading the Loss Causation Link, N.Y. L.J., Dec. 3,
2007, at S4 (discussing the application of Dura and Twombly on motions to
dismiss and noting that "[i]n many ways, Dura set the stage for Twombly"). As
will be discussed in this section, an examination of the Supreme Court's reasoning
in Dura provides support for the argument that the new Rule 8(a)(2) plausibility
pleading standard converges with the heightened pleading standards under Rule
9(b) and the PSLRA. Infra Part
104. 544 U.S. 336 (2005).
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niche pharmaceutical drugs.10 5  During the class period, Dura
allegedly issued materially false statements regarding its drug profits
and the future approval of a new asthmatic spray device by the Food
and Drug Administration, which artificially inflated Dura's stock
price.106 When the price of Dura's stock subsequently dropped by
47%, the class members brought a consolidated securities fraud class
action suit against Dura and its managers and directors in the District
Court for the Southern District of California.'0 7  The district court
found that the plaintiffs failed to adequately plead loss causation and
dismissed the case.s0 8 The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit,
however, reversed, holding that the plaintiffs, by alleging that they
had bought artificially overpriced stock, sufficiently plead loss
causation to survive Dura's motion to dismiss.109 In 2005, in order
to solve the confusion among the federal circuits regarding loss
causation, the Supreme Court granted Dura's petition for
certiorari. 110
Although mainly addressing the issue of what was required to
establish the element of loss causation under § 10(b) of the Exchange
105. In re Dura Pharm., Inc. Sec. Litig., No. Civ. 99CV0151-L(NLS), 2001
WL 35925887, at *1 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 2, 2001).
106. Id. at *1-2.
107. Id. at *2. The complaint alleged that the defendants had violated
§ 10(b) of the Exchange Act, SEC Rule lOb-5, and § 20(a) of the Exchange Act.
Id. Section 20(a) of the Exchange Act provides for joint and several liability of
controlling persons. See 15 U.S.C. § 78t(a) (2006); see also supra note 92
(providing further discussion on § 10(b) and Rule 1Ob-5).
108. Dura Pharm., 2001 WL 35925887, at *10. The court explained:
The [complaint] does not contain any allegations that the FDA's
non-approval had any relationship to the February price drop.
Accordingly, the [complaint] does not explain how the alleged
misrepresentations and omissions regarding Albuterol Spiros [the new
asthmatic spray device] "touched" upon the reasons for the decline in
Dura's stock price. Rather, the decline in Dura's stock price was the result
of an expected revenue shortfall. Accordingly, the [complaint's]
allegations regarding Albuterol Spiros are insufficient to state a claim.
Id.
109. Broudo v. Dura Pharm., Inc., 339 F.3d 933, 938, 941 (9th Cir. 2003),
rev'd, 544 U.S. 336 (2005) ("[L]oss causation does not require pleading a stock
price drop following a corrective disclosure or otherwise. It merely requires
pleading that the price at the time of purchase was overstated and sufficient
identification of the cause.").
110. Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 340 (2005).
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Act and SEC Rule 1Ob-5,"' the Supreme Court also addressed the
loss causation pleading issue.112 Without embracing a specific
standard for the pleading of loss causation, the Court opted to apply
the traditional notice pleading standard of Rule 8(a)(2). "' The
majority explained:
We concede that ordinary pleading rules are not
meant to impose a great burden upon a plaintiff. But
it should not prove burdensome for a plaintiff who
has suffered an economic loss to provide a defendant
with some indication of the loss and the causal
connection that the plaintiff has in mind. At the same
time, allowing a plaintiff to forgo giving any
indication of the economic loss and proximate cause
that the plaintiff has in mind would bring about harm
of the very sort the statutes seek to avoid."14
Thus, finding that the "artificially inflated purchase price"
was not itself a relevant economic loss and that the complaint failed
to provide notice of either the relevant economic loss or the
connection between that loss and the alleged misrepresentations, the
Supreme Court found the complaint legally insufficient."l5
Although the Supreme Court's language in Dura referring to
the Rule 8(a)(2) notice pleading standard may have been displaced
111. Id. at 342-46. The element of loss causation may be defined as a
"direct causal link between the misstatement and the claimant's economic loss."
Nathenson v. Zonagen, Inc., 267 F.3d 400, 413 (5th Cir. 2001).
112. Dura, 544 U.S. at 346-48 ("Our holding about plaintiffs' need to prove
proximate causation and economic loss leads us also to conclude that the plaintiffs'
complaint here failed adequately to allege these requirements.").
113. Id. at 346-47 (arguing that reaching the heightened pleading standard
was unnecessary because the complaint did not even meet the minimum pleading
standard under Rule 8(a)(2)); see also Gillespie, supra note 77, at 170 (examining
the holding in Dura and noting that "the Court chose not to articulate any
particular standard with respect to the proper pleading standard for plaintiffs loss
causation pleadings, again opting for an addition-by-subtraction approach"). In
making its decision, the Supreme Court assumed, "at least for argument's sake,
that neither the Rules nor the securities statutes impose any special further
requirement in respect to pleading of proximate causation or economic loss."
Dura, 544 U.S. at 346.




by subsequent case law, it may nonetheless imply that the Court
believed at that time that notice pleading was a sufficiently
challenging standard to meet.116 Accordingly, the Court's later
enhancement of the basic pleading requirements under Rule 8(a)(2)
may be seen as misguided. As will be discussed below, by
enhancing the basic pleading standard under Rule 8(a)(2), the
Supreme Court has elevated it to approach the level set forth by the
heightened pleading standards for allegations of fraud.
II. BLURRING THE LINES BETWEEN PLEADING DOCTRINES
Surviving a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss used to be
customary, but the new plausibility standard established in Twombly
and Iqbal has elevated the basic requirements that must be met in
any civil case for a complaint to be legally sufficient under Rule
8(a)(2). Federal courts and legal scholars, however, are still trying to
understand this notion of "plausibility" and the extent to which it has
enhanced the basic pleading requirements of Rule 8(a)(2). 17
Nonetheless, after Tellabs and Iqbal, the plausibility pleading
standard has been elevated to approach the level of the heightened
fraud pleading standard under Rule 9(b) and the scienter pleading
standard for securities fraud under the PSLRA, effectively blurring
116. The Supreme Court examined Dura in explaining the policy behind the
Twombly decision:
We alluded to the practical significance of the Rule 8 entitlement
requirement in [Dura] when we explained that something beyond the
mere possibility of loss causation must be alleged, lest a plaintiff with a
"largely groundless claim" be allowed to "take up the time of a number of
other people, with the right to do so representing an in terrorem increment
of the settlement value." So, when the allegations in a complaint,
however true, could not raise a claim of entitlement to relief, "this basic
deficiency should .. .be exposed at the point of minimum expenditure of
time and money by the parties and the court."
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 557-58 (2007) (citations omitted);
see also Spencer, supra note 23, at 451 ("[S]imply offering a complaint that sets
forth facts that render liability possible must be treated as insufficient given the
ability of high-dollar suits to coerce defendants into settlement in the interest of
avoiding the expense and uncertainty of discovery.").
117. See infra Part II.A.
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the lines between the pleading doctrines." 8 Furthermore, when these
converging pleading standards balance equivocal inferences-
inferences that are equally consistent with liability and non-
liability-a tacit "probability requirement" present in the
Twombly/Iqbal plausibility standard may make it more difficult for
plaintiffs alleging non-fraud claims to succeed against a Rule
12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. 119 As will be examined in the final part
of this article, this convergence of pleading doctrines creates an
incongruent federal civil litigation system because it may at times
treat plaintiffs more harshly in the pleading stage under Rule 8(a)(2)
than when alleging fraud under Rule 9(b) or the PSLRA.120
A. What is "Plausible"?
There is little doubt that Twombly elevated the pleadinq
requirements a plaintiff s complaint must meet under Rule 8(a)(2). 12
Nonetheless, the notion of plausibility is still far from being clearly
understood.122 In dismissing the complaint in Twombly, the Court
noted: "we do not require heightened fact pleading of specifics, but
only enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face. Because plaintiffs here have not nudged their claims across the
line from conceivable to plausible, their complaint must be
118. See infra Part II.B.
119. See infra Part II.C.
120. See infra Parts III-IV.
121. See, e.g., Pleading Standards, 121 HARV. L. REv. 305, 314 (2007)
("There is no doubt that a heightened pleading standard will reduce the costs that
discovery imposes generally, because fewer complaints will survive Rule 12(b)(6)
motions and reach the discovery phase. Yet the heightened standard might result
in the dismissal of some complaints that would be highly socially beneficial if
successful."); Richard M. Steuer, Plausible Pleading: Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly, 82 ST. JoHN's L. REv. 861, 875 (2008) ("The lesson to be learned from
Twombly is to investigate more thoroughly than ever before filing a complaint. A
strong hunch plus the prospect of substantiating that hunch in discovery is no
longer enough.").
122. See, e.g., Colleen McMahon, The Law of Unintended Consequences:
Shockwaves in the Lower Courts After Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 41
SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 851, 853 (2008) ("We district court judges suddenly and
unexpectedly find ourselves puzzled over something we thought we knew how to
do with our eyes closed: dispose of a motion to dismiss a case for failure to state a
claim."). Judge Colleen McMahon is a District Judge in the United States District
Court for the Southern District of New York. Id. at 851 n.2.
26 [ Vol. 30: 1
BLURRING THE LINES
dismissed."1 23 The Court also indicated that plausibility under Rule
8(a)(2) requires factual allegations that are "enough to raise a right to
relief above the speculative level," with neither labels nor
conclusions being sufficient.124 Furthermore, in Iqbal, the Supreme
Court explicitly clarified that facial plausibility exists "when the
plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged." 25 Under this standard, therefore, courts have the "context-
specific task" of determining whether the well-pleaded facts permit a
reasonable inference that plausibly-not merely possibly-indicate
liability; conclusory allegations are insufficient.' 26  Thus, the
Supreme Court has determined that claims that are merely
"possible," "conceivable," or "sjeculative" are legally insufficient to
meet the plausibility standard. 12
Federal courts of appeals, in interpreting Rule 8(a)(2)'s
plausibility pleading standard, generally have followed Twombly and
Iqbal's definition of plausibility.128 The Third Circuit, for example,
123. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).
124. See id at 555 (noting also that "a formulaic recitation of the elements
of a cause of action will not do").
125. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (emphasis added).
126. See id. at 1950 ("Determining whether a complaint states a plausible
claim for relief will . . . be a context-specific task."); see also Edward D.
Cavanagh, Twombly: The Demise of Notice Pleading, the Triumph of Milton
Handler, and the Uncertain Future of Private Antitrust Enforcement, 28 REV.
LITIG. 1, 15 (2008) ("Once again, trial courts are assigned the task of fathoming
the unfathomable-the distinction between allegations that are 'factual' and hence
valid, and those which are merely 'conclusory' and hence deficient.").
127. According to Merriam Webster's Collegiate Dictionary, the word
"plausible" is defined as: (1) "superficially fair, reasonable, or valuable but often
specious"; (2) "superficially pleasing or persuasive"; and (3) "appearing worthy of
belief." MERRIAM WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 892 (10th ed. 1996). The
Supreme Court in Iqbal correctly applied the term "plausible" when examining the
holding in Twombly, noting that, "[b]ecause the well-pleaded fact of parallel
conduct, accepted as true, did not plausibly suggest an unlawful agreement, the
Court held the plaintiffs' complaint must be dismissed." Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1950.
128. See, e.g., Braden v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 588 F.3d 585, 594 (8th Cir.
2009) ("The plausibility standard requires the plaintiff to show at the pleading
stage that success on the merits is more than a 'sheer possibility."'); Brooks v.
Ross, 578 F.3d 574, 581-82 (7th Cir. 2009) (finding that equivocal allegations are
insufficient to meet the plausibility standard); Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578
F.3d 203, 211-12 (3d Cir. 2009) (requiring the complaint to nudge the plaintiffs
claim "across the line from conceivable to plausible"); Courie v. Alcoa Wheel &
Forged Prods., 577 F.3d 625, 629-30 (6th Cir. 2009) (noting that a complaint need
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in finding that the plaintiffs complaint sufficiently alleged enough
facts to plausibly suggest a failure-to-transfer claim under the
Rehabilitation Act, 129 explained that, in order to show a plausible
claim for relief, "a complaint must do more than allege the plaintiff s
entitlement to relief. A complaint has to 'show' such an entitlement
with its facts."' 3 0  Similarly, in requiring the plaintiffs legal
conclusions to be grounded in a sufficiently plausible factual basis,
the Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of a § 1983 due process
claim because the allegations were "merely a formulaic recitation of
the cause of action" and failed to put the defendants on notice.'31
However, as noted by the Sixth Circuit, the proper interpretation of
plausibility is still being fleshed out by federal courts:
[W]hile this new Iqbal/Twombly standard screens out
the "little green men" cases just as Conley did, it is
designed to also screen out cases that, while not
utterly impossible, are "implausible." Exactly how
implausible is "implausible" remains to be seen, as
such a malleable standard will have to be worked out
in practice.132
only contain sufficient facts to be plausible); Sinaltrainal v. Coca-Cola Co., 578
F.3d 1252, 1270 (11th Cir. 2009) (finding that "vague and conclusory allegations"
are insufficient to meet the plausibility standard).
129. The Rehabilitation Act provides: "No otherwise qualified individual
with a disability in the United States . . . shall, solely by reason of her or his
disability, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be
subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal
financial assistance . . . ." 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (2006). After the enactment of the
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), the Rehabilitation Act was amended to
incorporate the ADA's standards for determining whether an employer has
engaged in employment discrimination. Id. at § 794(d).
130. Fowler, 578 F.3d at 211-12 ("Although [the plaintiffs] complaint is
not as rich with detail as some might prefer, it need only set forth sufficient facts to
support plausible claims.").
131. Brooks, 578 F.3d at 581-82.
132. Courie, 577 F.3d at 629-30 (citations omitted); see also Nicholas
Tymoczko, Note, Between the Possible and the Probable: Defining the Plausibility
Standard After Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 94 MINN. L.
REV. 505, 521 (noting that even though federal courts quickly began applying the
new plausibility standard under Rule 8(a)(2), they generally failed to properly
define its requirements). Scholars have similarly struggled with the defmition of
plausibility and the proper interpretation of the new Rule 8(a)(2) plausibility
standard. Professor A. Benjamin Spencer, for example, proposes a presumption-
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Thus, while federal courts continue their quest to ascertain
the proper definition of "plausibility" and the correct application of
the enhanced Rule 8(a)(2) pleading standard, plaintiffs may continue
to suffer from an unpredictable system that, as will be examined
below, fails to protect their interests by putting them at a
disadvantage when bringing forward civil claims not involving
fraud.
B. Pleading Standards Converge After Tellabs and Iqbal
Although Twombly left many pleading questions unanswered,
Iqbal served to clarify that the plausibility pleading standard would
apply in all civil cases.' 3 3 This expansion of the Supreme Court's
holding in Twombly, however, may have contributed to the
convergence of pleading standards. A strong indication that the
Supreme Court went too far in Iqbal is the fact that Justice Souter,
the author of the Twombly opinion,134 strongly criticized the holding
based theory of pleading, under which the plausibility standard may be met when a
complaint creates a presumption of impropriety by alleging objective facts and
supported implications. See A. Benjamin Spencer, Understanding Pleading
Doctrine, 108 MICH. L. REV. 1, 13-18 (2009) (explaining that, under his
descriptive theory of pleading, "legal claims that apply liability to factual scenarios
that otherwise do not bespeak wrongdoing will be those that tend to require greater
factual substantiation to traverse the plausibility threshold"). Another view is that
the plausibility standard may be equated with logical coherence-that in order to
meet the requirements of Rule 8(a)(2), a complaint must contain "allegations
necessary and sufficient to warrant liability." See Smith, supra note 23, at 1088-
89 (arguing that the plausibility pleading requirement "simply requires that
plaintiffs include allegations in their complaint that, if believed, are not merely
consistent with liability or non-liability, but rather affirmatively establish
liability"). A third approach, advocated by Professor Robert G. Bone, is to view
Twombly's plausibility pleading standard from a process-based perspective. See
Robert G. Bone, Twombly, Pleading Rules, and the Regulation of Court Access,
94 IOWA L. REV. 873, 900-10 (2009) (outlining a justification for the Twombly
standard in terms of balance between fairness to defendants and fairness to
plaintiffs). Under this last approach, the plausibility standard "requires no more
than that the allegations describe a state of affairs that differs significantly from a
baseline of normality and supports a probability of wrongdoing greater than the
background probability for situations of the same general type." Id. at 878.
133. Ashcroft v. lqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1953 (2009).
134. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 547 (2007). Justice Souter
was joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas,
Breyer, and Alito. Id.
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in Iqbal.13 5  Justice Souter's dissent-joined by Justices Stevens,
Ginsburg, and Breyer' 36 -asserted that "Twombly does not require a
court at the motion-to-dismiss stage to consider whether the factual
allegations are probably true[;]" to the contrary, "a court must take
the allegations as true, no matter how skeptical the court may be." 3 7
In arguing that Iqbal's complaint satisfied Rule 8(a)(2)'s plausibility
pleading standard, Justice Souter explained his disagreement with
the majority:
Under Twombly, the relevant question is whether,
assuming the factual allegations are true, the plaintiff
has stated a ground for relief that is plausible. That is,
in Twombly's words, a plaintiff must "allege facts"
that, taken as true, are "suggestive of illegal conduct."
. . . The difficulty [in Twombly] was that the conduct
alleged was "consistent with conspiracy, but just as
much in line with a wide swath of rational and
competitive business strategy unilaterally prompted
by common perceptions of the market." . . . Here, by
contrast, the allegations in the complaint are neither
confined to naked legal conclusions nor consistent
with legal conduct.' 38
As Justice Souter reasons, when presented with a Rule
12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a court's inquiry is not to determine
whether the factual allegations themselves are plausible, since they
must be taken as true. Rather, courts must focus on whether the
complaint, as a whole, states a claim that is plausible. In other
words, courts must ask whether the complaint provides enough facts
to raise a reasonable expectation that evidence of actionable
misconduct may be revealed through discovery, thus allowing the
135. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1954-61 (Souter, J., dissenting) (arguing that the
majority misapplied the pleading standard in Twombly); see also Rothman, supra
note 60, at 1 (noting that Justice Souter's dissent in Iqbal criticized the majority
opinion "for taking the holding in Twombly far beyond its original intent").
136. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1954. Justice Breyer also wrote a separate
dissenting opinion to point out that "prevent[ing] unwarranted litigation from
interfering with 'the proper execution of the work of the Government' was an
inadequate justification for the majority's interpretation of Twombly. Id at 1961.
137. Id. at 1959.
138. Id. at 1959-60 (citations omitted).
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court to draw a reasonable inference that the defendant is liable and
plausibly suggesting an entitlement to relief.139
Moreover, the majority in Iqbal adopted a two-pronged
approach to determining whether the allegations in the complaint
allowed a reasonable inference of liability to be drawn and thereby
satisfy the plausibility standard. 140  The Supreme Court explained
that a reviewing court must begin its analysis by identifying which
allegations in the complaint are factual allegations, which must be
taken as true, and which are legal conclusions, which do not enjoy
the presumption of truth.141 Under the second prong, the reviewing
court must examine the factual allegations and determine if the well-
pleaded facts plausibly suggest that the plaintiff is entitled to
relief.14 2 This approach comports with Rule 8(a)(2)'s two-pronged
requirement, as characterized by the Supreme Court in Twombly:
"the requirement of providing not only 'fair notice' of the nature of
the claim but also 'grounds' on which the claim rests." 143 Hence, the
Rule 8(a)(2) plausibility pleading standard, as adopted in Twombly
and expanded by Iqbal, may be somewhat easier to meet than the
fraud pleading standard under Rule 9(b) and the PSLRA's scienter
pleading standard for securities fraud. But, as will be discussed later,
139. See generally supra Part II.A (discussing the meaning of "plausible").
140. See Blumstein, supra note 63, at 24-25 (arguing that Iqbal requires the
reviewing court to (1) "weed out the legal conclusions" and (2) "evaluate the
factual allegations").
141. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1950-51. In rejecting Iqbal's allegations of
invidious discrimination, the Court notes that they are not being rejected because
they are "unrealistic or nonsensical," but because of their "conclusory nature." Id.
at 1951.
142. Id. at 1951. See Elizabeth Thornburg, Law, Facts, and Power, 114
PENN ST. L. REV. PENN. STATIM 1, 2 (2010), http://pennstatelawreview.org/114/
114 Penn%2OStatim%201.pdf ("The Supreme Court's opinion in Ashcroft v. Iqbal
is wrong in many ways, [including] the Court's single-handed return to a pleading
system that requires lawyers and judges to distinguish between pleading facts and
pleading law.").
143. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 n.3 (2007). Under the
new plausibility pleading standard, however, plaintiffs must engage in a delicate
balancing test when determining how much detail to include in the complaint,
since pleading facts too comprehensively or too technically may result in dismissal
of the complaint. See Tice, supra note 30, at 839-40 (explaining the risk of
plaintiffs pleading themselves out of court under Twombly and noting that
"[p]laintiffs should thus be careful in their pleading of detail and take comfort in
knowing that an error of less detail is rectifiable through a motion for a more
definitive statement, whereas too much detail risks summary dismissal
altogether").
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the way balances are weighed is different, which may lead to
different results for plaintiffs depending on whether their claims
involve fraud.144
Interestingly, the PSLRA's strong inference requirement for
pleading scienter in securities fraud cases may sometimes be
satisfied merely by meeting the plausibility requirement of Rule
8(a)(2), further suggesting the convergence of pleading standards.
Under Tellabs, the Supreme Court established that the PSLRA-by
requiring the pleading of sufficient facts to establish a strong
inference of scienter-required that a complaint allege facts that
would allow a reasonable person to draw an inference of scienter that
is "cogent and at least as compelling as any opposing inference.' 45
The PSLRA's cogency requirement establishes a plausibility
baseline that must be met by every inference of scienter to survive a
motion to dismiss: "to be cogent, an inference of scienter must be
substantial, even if not stron enough to compel a reasonable jury to
find in the plaintiffs favor." 46 And, in order for an inference to be
compelling, a balancing test-in which plausible culpable and non-
culpable explanations are examined-must be performed, after
which the inference must be found to be "strong in light of other
explanations."1 47 Thus, the inference of scienter need only be "at
least as likely as any plausible opposing inference." 48
Furthermore, given a strict interpretation of plausibility
pleading and fraud pleading, these pleading standards may also
appear to be nearly equivalent.149  In Iqbal, by expanding the
plausibility pleading standard to all elements of a claim, the Supreme
Court required allegations of falsity and culpability to meet the
plausibility pleading standard, even where Rule 9(b)'s specificity
144. See infra Part II.C.
145. Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 324 (2007).
146. Miller, supra note 87, at 514-15 (advocating the view that the cogency
standard should fall between a preponderance standard-the inference of scienter
being sufficiently strong for a reasonable jury to be able to find for the plaintiff if
the facts alleged are proved at trial-and a summary judgment standard).
147. Tellabs, 551 U.S. at 323-24; see also Berarducci & Obhof, supra note
82, at 10 (arguing that Tellabs gave "significant teeth" to the statutory language of
the PSLRA).
148. Tellabs, 551 U.S. at 328-29 (emphasis added).
149. See, e.g., Spencer, supra note 23, at 473-75 (arguing that Twombly's
plausibility requirement "is tantamount to a particularity requirement").
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requirement does not apply.150  Rule 9(b)'s second sentence,
however, allows conditions of the mind to be averred generally, but
Twombly's new plausibility standard-requiring the pleading of facts
enough to raise a reasonable expectation of entitlement to relief-
seems to be analogous to the particularity requirement in the first
sentence of Rule 9(b).' 5' This view is further reinforced when
examining the Supreme Court's explanation that, even though
"generally" in the context of Rule 9(b) is a relative term that must be
compared to the particularity pleading requirement for fraud, the
plausibility pleading requirements of Rule 8(a)(2) must still be
met. 152 The Court explicitly noted, "the Federal Rules do not require
courts to credit a complaint's conclusory statements without
reference to its factual context."1 5 3 Thus, in requiring a plaintiff to
plead specific facts to state a claim that is facially plausible, thereby
allowing the court to make a reasonable inference of liability, the
Supreme Court seems to be elevating the basic pleading
requirements of Rule 8(a)(2) to approach a particularity pleading
standard equivalent to Rule 9(b)'s heightened fraud pleading
standard.154  This finding becomes even more relevant when
examined in conjunction with the scienter pleading requirement for
securities fraud examined above, which was governed by Rule 9(b),
rather than Rule 8(a)(2), prior to the enactment of the PSLRA.155
150. Blumstein, supra note 63, at 24; see also Bernstein & Scaduto, supra
note 71, at 4 (noting that, in securities litigation, "IqballTwombly will require the
pleading of factual content that makes allegations such as causation, falsity, and
negligence plausible, even when fraud is not alleged").
151. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007); see also
Spencer, supra note 23, at 475-77 (examining the pleading standard rejected by
the Supreme Court in Swierkiewicz v. Sorema, N.A., 534 U.S. 506 (2002) to argue
that "plausibility pleading is heightened particularized pleading plain and simple").
152. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1954 (2009) ("Rule 8 does not
empower respondent to plead the bare elements of his cause of action, affix the
label 'general allegation,' and expect his complaint to survive a motion to
dismiss.").
153. Id.
154. See, e.g., ABC Arbitrage Plaintiffs Group v. Tchuruk, 291 F.3d 336,
349 (5th Cir. 2002) (equating Rule 9(b)'s fraud pleading standard to the PSLRA's
pleading standard).
155. See Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 319-20
(2007) ("Prior to the enactment of the PSLRA, the sufficiency of a complaint for
securities fraud was governed not by Rule 8, but by the heightened pleading
standard set forth in Rule 9(b)."). Moreover, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals,
for example, has equated Rule 9(b)'s fraud pleading standard to the PSLRA's
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Therefore, even though meeting the scienter pleading
standard's strong inference requirement in cases of securities fraud
under the PSLRA and the heightened fraud pleading standard's
particularity requirement in civil fraud cases under Rule 9(b) places a
higher burden on plaintiffs, Rule 8(a)(2)'s plausibility requirement is
not far from requiring cogency and particularity. Furthermore, as
will be examined below, the way in which these pleading standards
weigh inferences that are equally consistent with liability and non-
liability affects plaintiffs differently, in a manner that is
counterintuitive and incongruent with the purpose of the pleading
doctrines.
C. Ties Make a Difference15 6
In Twombly, the Supreme Court suggested that equally
weighing inferences would be insufficient to meet the plausibility
pleading standard: "The need at the pleading stage for allegations
plausibly suggesting (not merely consistent with) [unlawful conduct]
reflects the threshold requirement of Rule 8(a)(2) . . . . The
complaint, therefore, must contain sufficient factual allegations to
allow a reasonable inference that the defendant is liable, which may
be viewed as analogous to a preponderance of the evidence standard
(even though the Supreme Court seemingly rejects any notion that a
"probability requirement" is being imposed by the plausibility
pleading standard for misleading statements and omissions in securities litigation.
ABC Arbitrage, 291 F.3d at 348-50; In re Fleming Cos. Inc. Sec. & Derivative
Litig., No. CivA503MD1530TJW, 2004 WL 5278716, at *6 (E.D. Tex. June 16,
2004).
156. Unlike in baseball-where participants follow the unwritten rule that a
"tie goes to the runner"-a tie goes to the defendant under the new Rule 8(a)(2)
plausibility pleading standard when there are equally weighing inferences at the
pleading stage. See Tim McClelland, Ask the Umpire, MLB.COM,
http://mlb.mlb.com/mlb/official-info/umpires/feature.jsp?feature=mcclellandqa
(last visited Nov. 11, 2010) (explaining that, although no "tie goes to the runner"
rule exists in the books, "the runner must beat the ball to first base, and so if he
doesn't beat the ball," he is called out).
157. Bell Ad. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 557 (2007); see also
Spencer, supra note 23, at 445 (explaining that a plaintiffs complaint may no
longer survive a motion to dismiss if it contains equivocal facts, "meaning the
allegations are consistent both with the asserted legality and with an innocent
alternate explanation").
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standard).15 8 This position is further developed in Iqbal, where the
majority explains:
The plausibility standard is not akin to a "probability
requirement," but it asks for more than a sheer
possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.
Where a complaint pleads facts that are "merely
consistent with" a defendant's liability, it "stops short
of the line between possibility and plausibility of
'entitlement to relief."'l
59
Thus, under the Rule 8(a)(2) plausibility standard, if the
allegations contained in the plaintiffs complaint raise equivocal
inferences, the defendant may be successful in dismissing the
complaint by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss.1 60 In other words,
under the Iqbal/Twombly Rule 8(a)(2) plausibility pleading standard,
a tie goes to the defendant.
On the other hand, under the PSLRA's scienter pleading
standard for securities fraud, a tie goes to the plaintiff. In Tellabs,
the Supreme Court clarified that, in order to survive a motion to
dismiss, a plaintiff alleging securities fraud was required to plead
sufficient facts to suggest a strong inference of scienter-a cogent
inference that is "at least as compelling as any opposing inference of
non-fraudulent intent."1 61 Moreover, writing for the majority, Justice
Ginsburg explained that plausible opposing inferences of culpability
and non-culpability must be taken into account when determining
158. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556 ("Asking for plausible grounds to infer
an agreement does not impose a probability requirement at the pleading stage; it
simply calls for enough fact[s] to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will
reveal evidence of illegal agreement."). The preponderance of the evidence
standard requires a plaintiff to demonstrate that the factual allegations more likely
than not suggest liability. Metro. Stevedore Co. v. Rambo, 521 U.S. 121, 137 n.9
(1997).
159. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009).
160. E.g., Brooks v. Ross, 578 F.3d 574, 581-82 (7th Cir. 2009) (affirming
the dismissal of a complaint containing equivocal allegations). The court in
Brooks stated, "The behavior [the plaintiff] has alleged that the defendants
engaged in is just as consistent with lawful conduct as it is with wrongdoing.
Without more, [the plaintiffs] allegations are too vague to provide notice to
defendants of the contours of his § 1983 due process claim." Id.
161. Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 314 (2007)
(emphasis added).
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162whether an inference of scienter is "strong" under the PSLRA.
The inference of culpability "need not be irrefutable . . . or even the
'most plausible of competing inferences,"' but it must be at least as
compelling as opposing inferences of non-culpability.163 Thus, at the
pleading stage, a plaintiff is only required to demonstrate that the
inference of scienter is "at least as likely as any plausible opposing
inference[;]" it is not until the actual trial stage that the plaintiff must
prove his case by a preponderance of the evidence-in other words,
that "it is more likely than not that the defendant acted with
scienter."16
Hence, upon examining the convergence of pleading
standards after Tellabs and Iqbal, the Supreme Court has elevated
the basic Rule 8(a)(2) pleading standard to approach the level of
Rule 9(b)'s fraud pleading standard and the PSLRA's scienter
pleading standard. Moreover, when the plausibility pleading
standard and the scienter pleading standard under the PSLRA are
compared, an apparent probability requirement in Rule 8(a)(2)'s
plausibility pleading standard makes it an unduly onerous standard
towards plaintiffs. As will be further discussed below, although
these pleading standards converge, the plaintiff is affected differently
in the case of a tie depending on which pleading standard the
166
complaint is required to meet. This convergence creates
162. Id. at 323-24 ("The strength of an inference cannot be decided in a
vacuum."). Concurring in the judgment, Justice Scalia asserted the following:
I fail to see how an inference that is merely "at least as compelling as any
opposing inference," can conceivably be called what the statute here at
issue requires: a "strong inference." If a jade falcon were stolen from a
room to which only A and B had access, could it possibly be said there
was a "strong inference" that B was the thief? I think not, and I therefore
think that the Court's test must fail. In my view, the test should be
whether the inference of scienter (if any) is more plausible than the
inference of innocence.
Id. at 329 (Scalia, J., concurring). Justice Ginsburg defends the majority's
standard against Justice Scalia's argument by noting that "an inference at least as
likely as competing inferences can, in some cases, warrant recovery." Id. at 324
n.5 (citing Summers v. Tice, 199 P.2d 1, 3-5 (Cal. 1948)).
163. Tellabs, 551 U.S. at 324.
164. Id. at 328-29.
165. See supra Part II.B.
166. Although not examined in this article, convergence may also suggest
that the heightened pleading standards predicated on allegations of fraud may be
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incongruity in the federal civil litigation system because, under the
recent Supreme Court decisions examined above, plaintiffs may be
treated as harshly when pleading non-fraud claims as when pleading
fraud, especially when compared to claims of securities fraud under
the PSLRA.
III. JUDICIAL ACTIVISM MAY PLAUSIBLY RESULT IN HARSHER
TREATMENT OF PLAINTIFFS PLEADING NON-FRAUDULENT
CLAIMS
The lines between pleading doctrines have been blurred by
the Supreme Court's recent introduction of a tacit "probability
requirement" into the basic pleading standard under Twombly and
Iqbal, making it more difficult for plaintiffs alleging non-fraudulent
claims to survive motions to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). This
result is especially disturbing due to the fact that each pleading
standard was influenced by different policy concerns, which explains
why there should be different levels of pleading depending on the
nature of the claims.16 7 Moreover, the convergence of pleading
standards has produced incongruity in the federal civil litigation
system by at times treating plaintiffs more leniently when bringing
fraud claims under the PSLRA than when stating non-fraudulent
claims under the enhanced Rule 8(a)(2) plausibility pleading
standard. 168 Therefore, it appears as if the Supreme Court, while
heightening the basic pleading standard for all federal civil cases,
engaged in judicial activism by overturning fifty years of precedent
and bypassing the proper rule amendment process in order to protect
litigants from extravagant discovery costs and to deter vexatious
litigation.169 Although there may be merit to the Supreme Court's
concern with abusive litigation, the basic pleading standard under
superfluous. See, e.g., Neil Pandey-Jorrin, A Case for Amending the Private
Securities Litigation Reform Act: Why Increasing Shareholders' Rights to Sue Will
Help Prevent the Next Financial Crisis and Better Inform the Investing Public,
Bus. L. BRIEF, Spring 2009, at 15, 18 (arguing that Twombly and Rule 9 "already
encompass many of the concerns that Congress contemplated when it passed the
PSLRA in 1995, and such requirements in the Act are duplicative and unfairly
burden plaintiffs when pleading their case").
167. See infra Part III.A.
168. See infra Part III.B.
169. See infra Part III.C.
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Rule 8(a)(2) should nonetheless be nowhere near the level of the
heightened pleading standards predicated on allegations of fraud.
A. Differing Policy Concerns Lead to Different Pleading
Standards
Rule 8 should be understood in light of the entire federal
procedural system, in which the main function of pleadings is to
provide notice.' 7 0  But although the original policy concern when
enacting Rule 8(a)(2) may have been to prevent the premature
dismissal of meritorious claims,' 7 1 the Supreme Court in Twombly
abandoned the notice pleading standard and adopted the plausibility
pleading standard, primarily because of its concern with the risk of
astronomical discovery costs being used to force litigants into
settling cases.172  Relying on Dura, the Supreme Court rejected
various arguments before concluding that application of the
plausibility pleading standard was probably the only way "to avoid
the potentially enormous expense of discovery in cases with no
'reasonably founded hope that the [discovery] process will reveal
170. See Fairman, supra note 19, at 556-58 (explaining that pleadings have
an important dual function: providing notice to litigants while also encouraging
determination of claims on the merits).
171. See ADVISORY COMM. ON RULES FOR CIVIL PROCEDURE, 1955 REP. OF
THE ADVISORY COMM. PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE RULES OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE FOR THE U.S. DISTRICT COURTS (1955), reprinted in 12A CHARLES
ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE app. F
at 655 (3d ed. 2010) ("The intent and effect of the rules is to permit the claim to be
stated in general terms; the rules are designed to discourage battles over mere form
of statement and to sweep away the needless controversies which the codes
permitted that served either to delay trial on the merits or to prevent a party from
having a trial because of mistakes in statement."); see also Charles B. Campbell, A
"Plausible" Showing After Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 9 NEV. L.J. 1, 10-21
(2008) (examining the evolution of the basic pleading standard under Rule
8(a)(2)); Cavanagh, supra note 126, at 19 (noting that the drafters' goal was to
allow meritorious claims to easily move to trial and to prevent technical pleading
rules from blocking legitimate claims); Epstein, supra note 1, at 98-99 (arguing
for the application of a mini-summary judgment at the motion-to-dismiss stage
where the full record fails to support any plausible factual inference of liability and
noting that "[t]he current provisions of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were
designed in an earlier era for litigation that on average has been far simpler than
litigation today").
172. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 558-60 (2007).
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relevant evidence' to support an inference of liability."1 73  The
majority noted that it was concerned with the increasing costs of
modem federal antitrust litigation and asserted that judicial
supervision, clear jury instructions, and increased scrutiny of
evidence at the summary judgment stage would all be insufficient to
combat discovery abuse.' 4 Thus, the Court chose to err on the side
of dismissal rather than acquiescing in the specter of defendants
being "forced" to settle due to the high costs of discovery. 7 1
Justice Stevens, however, dissenting from the majority
opinion in Twombly, argued that the "transparent policy concern"
driving the majority's decision was the interest in protecting wealthy
corporate defendants from the high costs of pretrial discovery in
federal antitrust litigation.176 Similarly, Justice Breyer, in his Iqbal
dissent, expressed his disagreement with using the new plausibility
pleading standard "to prevent unwarranted litigation from interfering
with 'the proper execution of the work of the Government' because
the law provides for other legal weapons to protect the government
against unwarranted interference. 7 7  Thus, as discussed below, the
Supreme Court elevated the basic pleading standard seemingly due
173. Id. at 559 (quoting Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Bruodo, 544 U.S. 336, 347
(2005)); see also Pleading Standards, supra note 121, at 312-13 (noting that the
Supreme Court appeared to be "motivated by a desire to increase efficiency by
allowing judges to dismiss the cases in which discovery seems least likely to be
fruitful," and arguing that the Court acted under the assumption that "procedural
rules should ultimately be normatively evaluated under a social welfare calculus").
174. Id at 559 (noting that, if left unresolved, "the threat of discovery
expense will push cost-conscious defendants to settle even anemic cases before
reaching [the proposed] proceedings").
175. In examining the possibility of allowing discovery, Justice Scalia
emphasized the expense of the discovery process:
How much money do you think it would have cost the defendants by then
to assemble all of the documents that you're going to be interested in
looking at? How many buildings will have to be rented to store those
documents and how many years will be expended in, in gathering all the
materials?
Transcript of Oral Argument at 54, Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544 (2007) (No. 05-1126), 2006 WL 3422211.
176. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 596-97 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
177. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1961 (2009) (Breyer, J., dissenting)
(noting that, for example, "where a Government defendant asserts a qualified
immunity defense, the trial court . . . can structure discovery in ways that diminish
the risk of imposing unwarranted burdens on public officials").
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to its concern with vexatious litigation and excessive discovery
costs. 178
Unlike with Rule 8(a)(2)'s new plausibility standard, various
policy reasons have been offered to justify the inclusion of the
particularity requirement of Rule 9(b) from its inception. 179 Because
of the implication of moral turpitude inherent in fraud claims, the
desire to protect a potential defendant's reputation has historically
been the strongest justification for the particularity requirement.'8 0
Rule 9(b) has also been justified as an adequate strike-suit and
frivolous-claim deterrent due to the higher pleading burden imposed
upon plaintiffs.'8 1  Yet another policy reason behind Rule 9(b)'s
heightened fraud pleading standard is the reluctance of courts to
178. Dating back to 1975, the Supreme Court has confined the scope of the
federal securities laws due to its concern with strike suit litigation. E.g., Blue Chip
Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 769 (1975). Dissenting in Blue Chip
Stamps, Justice Blackmun stated:
[T]he greater portion of the Court's opinion is devoted to its discussion of
the 'danger of vexatiousness' that accompanies litigation under Rule 1Ob-
5 and that is said to be 'different in degree and in kind from that which
accompanies litigation in general.' It speaks of harm from the 'very
pendency of the lawsuit,' something like the recognized dilemma of the
physician sued for malpractice; of the 'disruption of normal business
activities which may accompany a lawsuit'; and of 'proof . . . which
depend(s) almost entirely on oral testimony,' as if all these were unknown
to lawsuits taking place in America's courthouses every day.
Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
179. WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 68, § 1296; see also Fairman, supra
note 19, at 563-65 (discussing the four most popular reasons supporting the
imposition of a particularity requirement in cases of fraud); William M. Richman,
Donald E. Lively & Patricia Mell, The Pleading of Fraud: Rhymes without
Reason, 60 S. CAL. L. REv. 959, 961-65 (1987) (examining and criticizing the
different policy reasons behind Rule 9(b)).
180. WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 68, § 1296; see Fairman, supra note 19,
at 563-64 (arguing that the protection-of-reputation rationale is important because
of the potential damage to a defendant's reputation). But see Richman et al., supra
note 179, at 962 (arguing that reputation-saving may be an inadequate justification
for the particularity requirement because Rule 9(b)'s pleading standard does not
cover claims such as malpractice and wrongful death, which may also be
damaging to reputation or involve moral turpitude).
181. Fairman, supra note 19, at 564; Richman et al., supra note 179, at 962-
63; see also WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 68, § 1296 (noting the frequent misuse
of fraud or mistake allegations solely as nuisances or to encourage settlements and
arguing that "unfounded fraud claims should be identified and disposed of early").
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reopen completed transactions.182 Finally, the particularized
pleading required under Rule 9(b) has probably been most
commonly justified by the need to provide the defendant with fair
and adequate notice of the substance of the claim, due mainly to the
"intrinsic amorphousness" of fraud claims and because they may
reach back many years and implicate a large number of
defendants. 183
The PSLRA, on the other hand, is of more recent vintage, and
the drafters' intent is easier to ascertain. In prescribing a workable
construction of the PSLRA's scienter pleading standard in Tellabs,
the Supreme Court explained that its interpretation of the "strong
inference" standard was based on the PSLRA's two main goals: "to
curb frivolous, lawyer-driven litigation, while preserving investor's
ability to recover on meritorious claims."1 4 Yet the Court
emphasized that the scienter pleading requirements "are but one
constraint among many the PSLRA installed to screen out frivolous
suits, while allowing meritorious actions to move forward."1 85 The
House Report, however, clarifies that, because Rule 9(b)'s
particularity requirement had failed to thwart private litigants' abuse
of the securities laws, the Conference Committee's intention in
enacting the heightened scienter pleading standard was to
"strengthen the existing pleading requirements."' 86 Thus, Congress
passed the PSLRA to protect litigants from being forced to settle
meritless claims due to excessive litigation and discovery costs
- - 187inherent in securities claims.
The policy concerns that inspired the Supreme Court's
heightening of the basic pleading standard through Twombly and
Iqbal seem to be the same as those that motivated Congress to pass
the PSLRA in 1995. It should therefore come as no surprise that the
standards converge. The original intent behind Rule 8(a)(2),
182. WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 68, § 1296; Fairman, supra note 19, at
564-65; Richman et al., supra note 179, at 964-65.
183. Fairman, supra note 19, at 565; Richman et al., supra note 179, at 963-
64.
184. Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 322 (2007).
185. Id. at 324.
186. H.R. REP. No. 104-369, at 41 (1995) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1995
U.S.C.C.A.N. 730, 1995 WL 709276.
187. See supra notes 78-83 and accompanying text; see also Wunderlich,
supra note 87, at 654 ("Congress was concerned that plaintiffs file frivolous
lawsuits in an effort to find a sustainable claim, not yet alleged in the complaint,
through the discovery process.").
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however, was not to deter vexatious litigation, but rather to provide
defendants with ade uate notice and prevent early dismissal of
meritorious claims.' 8  Hence, the pleading standards that were
originally adopted with different policy concerns in mind now
converge, thus plausibly discriminating against those plaintiffs
bringing forward non-fraud claims in federal courts.
B. The Convergence ofPleading Standards Creates an
Incongruous and Unfair Federal Civil Litigation
System
Even if the costs of litigation and abusive discovery practices
are reduced by enhancing the basic pleading standard for federal
civil litigation, there are various social costs and benefits that must
be weighed.189 One of the costs apparently not considered by the
Supreme Court in adopting the plausibility pleading standard is that
the inclusion of a tacit "probability requirement" at the pleading
stage is unfair to allegedly aggrieved plaintiffs, especially when
compared to the requirements for pleading scienter in securities
fraud cases under the PSLRA. As discussed above, the PSLRA
requires an inference of scienter to be at least as compelling as any
opposing inference,190 rather than requiring enough facts to allow the
reviewing court to make a reasonable inference of liability at the
motion-to-dismiss stage, as is the case under the Rule 8(a)(2)
enhanced plausibility pleading standard.191
Prior to the establishment of the plausibility pleading
standard in Twombly, there were four main aspects to the Rule
8(a)(2) pleading doctrine: the complaint served a notice function;
factual detail was unnecessary; only when the absence of a claim
was certain was dismissal warranted; and other pretrial procedures,
188. See supra note 171 and accompanying text.
189. See Pleading Standards, supra note 121, at 314 ("[E]ven if the Court's
new pleading standard weeds out numerous meritless claims, it might still be
detrimental to social welfare if it results in the dismissal of valid claims whose
benefits would exceed the costs of meritless claims.").
190. See Tellabs, 551 U.S. at 314 ("[A]n inference of scienter must be more
than merely plausible or reasonable-it must be cogent and at least as compelling
as any opposing inference of non-fraudulent intent."); see also supra notes 78-102
and accompanying text.
191. See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007) (discussing
that a probability requirement is not required at the pleading stage).
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rather than the pleadings, were the proper tools to screen out
unmeritorious claims.' 92 In abandoning the notice pleading standard
adopted in Conley, the Supreme Court deviated from these basic
tenets and elevated the basic pleading standard for all federal civil
cases to a point where it now converges with the two heightened
pleading standards predicated on allegations of fraud.
In raising the basic pleading standard to approach the scienter
pleading standard required under the PSLRA for cases of securities
fraud, the Supreme Court has put plaintiffs alleging non-fraudulent
claims at a disadvantage. It has been argued, however, that the
practical effect of the difference between having a pleading standard
that requires the inference of culpability to be at least as likely as an
opposing inference and one that requires the inference of culpability
to be more plausible than the inference of innocence is probably
small, because "federal courts are unlikely to see a deluge of cases
where the inference of scienter is exactly as plausible as the
inference of innocence."' 93 Nonetheless, the enhanced plausibility
pleading standard under Rule 8(a)(2) will likely be harsher towards
plaintiffs putting forward claims in which evidence of actionable
misconduct is harder to obtain at the motion-to-dismiss stage, such
as discrimination, conspiracy, and certain securities claims.' 9 4 This
may be true even where there are no allegations of fraud in the
complaint:
[P]roducts liability, civil conspiracy, antitrust, and
civil rights claims, for example, are more challenging
192. Spencer, supra note 23, at 438-39; see also WRIGHT & MILLER, supra
note 68, § 1202 (noting that the four major functions of pleadings have historically
been "(1) giving notice of the nature of a claim or defense; (2) stating the facts
each party believes to exist; (3) narrowing the issues that must be litigated; and (4)
providing a means for speedy disposition of sham claims and insubstantial
defenses").
193. Berarducci & Obhof, supra note 82, at 11; see also The Supreme Court,
supra note 86, at 392 (examining the Supreme Court's opinion in Tellabs and
noting that "both Justice Alito and Justice Scalia seemed to believe that the change
from the majority's 'at least as compelling' rule to Justice Scalia's 'more
compelling' rule would not make much of a practical difference").
194. See Spencer, supra note 23, at 459 ("Although Twombly's plausibility
pleading standard does not just apply to antitrust cases, it is probably correct to say
that the standard will be more demanding in the context of claims in which direct
evidence supporting the wrongdoing is difficult for plaintiffs to identify at the
complaint stage.").
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to allege because each claim requires the proffering of
a supposition of some sort to turn what happened into
an actionable event. . . . It thus appears that if a claim
places liability on occurrences or omissions for which
objective facts make the implication of wrongdoing
apparent, that claim will require less factual detail
than a claim that depends on subjective motivations or
concealed activities.195
In the case of securities litigation, there are numerous claims
that were subject to the flexible Rule 8(a)(2) notice pleading standard
that are now subject to Twombly's plausibility pleading standard; for
example, claims brought under § 11 of the Securities Act of 1933
(the Securities Act),196 claims brought under § 12(a) of the Securities
Act,197 as well as claims brought under § 14(a) of the Exchange
Act.198  But these claims are now at risk of being prematurely
dismissed under the plausibility pleading standard due to the inherent
difficulty in providing evidence at the motion-to-dismiss stage in
securities cases-even those in which there are no allegations of
195. Spencer, supra note 132, at 33-34.
196. 15 U.S.C. § 77k (2006). Section 11 of the Securities Act provides a
private right of action for materially false or misleading statements contained in a
registration statement. See STEINBERG, supra note 82, at 309-20 (examining the
statutory framework and the elements of the § 11 right of action).
197. 15 U.S.C. § 771 (2006). Section 12(a)(1) of the Securities Act provides
purchasers of securities with an express private right of action against the seller, if
such seller offers or sells the security in violation of § 5 of the Securities Act. See
STEINBERG, supra note 82, at 362 (explaining how a violation of § 5 generally
imposes strict liability against the seller of the security). Section 12(a)(2) of the
Securities Act provides purchasers of securities with an express private right of
action against the seller where the purchasers acquired the securities by means of a
prospectus or oral communication that contained a material misstatement or
omission. See STEINBERG, supra note 82, at 362-84 (examining the meaning of
"seller" under § 12(a)(2), the Supreme Court's limitation of § 12(a)(2)'s scope to
public offerings, the "in pari delicto" and reasonable care defenses, and whether
there is a right of action for either indemnification or contribution under
§ 12(a)(2)).
198. 15 U.S.C. § 78n (2006). Section 14(a) of the Exchange Act prohibits
the solicitation of proxies containing any materially false or misleading statement.
See STEINBERG, supra note 82, at 517-37 (explaining the manner in which § 14(a)
"regulate[s] the solicitation of proxies with respect to securities registered under
§ 12 of the Exchange Act").
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fraud.199 As noted by Professor Spencer:
[G]etting past neutral facts to those suggestive of
liability will be more difficult in those cases where
suppositions about the defendants' subjective
motivations or concealed activities are needed to
overcome the presumption of propriety. When such
information is unknown or unknowable from the
plaintiffs perspective at the pleading stage, the
doctrine is too unforgiving and unaccommodating,
leaving plaintiffs with potentially valid claims with no
access to the system.20 0
Similarly, the plausibility standard should not resemble the
heightened fraud pleading standard under Rule 9(b), which clearly
creates an exception to Rule 8(a)(2) by imposing a particularity
199. See, e.g., Panther Partners, Inc. v. Ikanos Commc'ns, Inc., 347 F.
App'x 617, 620 (2d Cir. 2009) (dismissing a complaint alleging violation of §§ 11,
12, and 15 of the Securities Act because the plaintiffs failed to allege sufficient
facts under Twombly's plausibility pleading standard to complete the chain of
causation required to prove that false statements were negligently made by
defendants); In re Thornburg Mortg., Inc. Sec. Litig., 683 F. Supp. 2d 1236, 1261
(D.N.M. 2010) (granting underwriter/defendants' motion to dismiss where
purchasers failed to adequately allege that the offering documents contained false
or misleading statements or omissions); In re Morgan Stanley Tech. Fund Sec.
Litig., 643 F. Supp. 2d 366, 380-81 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (granting defendants' motion
to dismiss after holding that, even if the court had accepted the plaintiffs'
"'conclusory allegations' that the mutual funds[']" prospectus materials were
materially misleading, plaintiffs nonetheless failed to plead sufficient facts to show
that defendants owed a duty to disclose); see also Pleading Securities Fraud with
Particularity under Rule 9(b), supra note 76, at 1436 (discussing the difficulty in
pleading securities fraud even before the PSLRA enhanced the scienter pleading
requirements, and noting that, "[bjecause the plaintiff in a securities fraud case is
likely to have little first-hand knowledge about the particulars of a fraudulent
transaction, such a plaintiff will typically have greater difficulty pleading fraud
with particularity than will a plaintiff alleging common law fraud"). The difficulty
in pleading securities claims, however, is not restricted to those including
allegations of fraud. See generally Michael C. Tu & Lucy E. Buford, Supreme
Court's Twombly Ruling Will Mean Higher Pleading Requirements for Some
Securities Litigation Claims, SEC. REFORM ACT LITIG. REP. (2007),
http://www.orrick.com/fileupload/1203.pdf (discussing the difficulty in pleading
securities claims under Twombly).
200. See Spencer, supra note 132, at 36.
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requirement.201 Requiring particularity at the pleading stage in every
civil case would not only make the mandate of Rule 9(b)
superfluous, but would impose an undue burden upon plaintiffs and
violate one of the basic objectives of Rule 8-preventing civil cases
from turning on technicalities. 202
Thus, by enhancing the basic pleading requirements for all
federal civil suits under Rule 8(a)(2), the Supreme Court has put
plaintiffs at a disadvantage by including a hidden "probability
requirement" at the pleading stage that will effectively reduce their
chances of surviving a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss when there
exist equally plausible inferences of liability as there are of non-
liability. 203  Yet, this convergence of pleading standards does not
only have the potential of being unfair towards plaintiffs, but may
also create a federal civil litigation system that is incongruous. Even
though Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure was
designed to facilitate access to the courts and allow claims to be
resolved on the merits, the new plausibility pleading standard
focuses primarily on deterring vexatious litigation (for which
purpose the system has already imposed heightened pleading
requirements for different types of claims).204 Moreover, as will be
discussed below, the Supreme Court sidestepped the appropriate rule
amendment process and overturned fifty years of precedent,
suggesting that the Court engaged in judicial rulemaking.
C. The Supreme Court's Judicial Activism
After examining the different policy concerns that motivated
201. See FED. R. CIv. P. 9(b) ("In alleging fraud or mistake, a party must
state with particularity the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake."); see also
Pleading Standards, supra note 121, at 311 ("Rule 9 creates clear exceptions to the
rule that facts do not need to be pleaded with any specificity; thus, the action to
which Rule 9 is inapplicable must not require particularized pleading of facts.").
202. WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 68, § 1215.
203. See, e.g., Cavanagh, supra note 126, at 25-26 (noting that dismissing
claims at the pleading stage before any discovery "puts prospective plaintiffs at a
severe disadvantage because it denies them equal access to proof'); Spencer, supra
note 23, at 447 ("[T]he Court's rejection of Conley's 'no set of facts' standard is a
clear indication of the fact that the Court's plausibility pleading is a new, more
stringent pleading standard that deprives plaintiffs the benefits of inferences in
their favor when the pleaded facts are consistent with alternative explanations that
do not involve wrongdoing.") (internal quotations omitted).
204. See supra notes 170-88 and accompanying text.
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the creation of different pleading standards and how these pleading
standards are now converging-the plausibility pleading standard
approaching the level of the heightened pleadings standards
predicated on allegations of fraud under Rule 9(b) and the PSLRA-
one question remains: Was the Supreme Court205 heightening the
basic pleading standard for all federal civil cases in order to deter
vexatious litigation? If so, the Court has engaged in judicial activism
by overturning fifty years of precedent and bypassing the proper
procedures set forth to amend the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.206
There are various ways in which judicial behavior may be
considered "activist,"207 and judicial activism is not restricted to
judges of a specific ideology. 208  As noted by Dean Erwin
Chemerinsky, "[c]onservative justices are happy to be activists when
it serves their ideological agenda." 209 But judicial activism from the
205. The opinion in Twombly was authored by Justice Souter and joined by
Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, Breyer, and Alito.
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 547 (2007). The opinion in Iqbal was
authored by Justice Kennedy and joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices
Scalia, Thomas, and Alito. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1941 (2009).
206. See Kimberly Atkins, Congress Questions Pleading Decisions:
Lawmakers, Witnesses Discuss Impact of 'Iqbal', Twombly' Rulings, LAWS.
USA, Oct. 28, 2009, available at http://www.allbusiness.com/legal/evidence-
witnesses/13363806-1.html (discussing the congressional reaction to the Twombly
and Iqbal decisions). Some commentators, however, defend the Twombly decision
as flowing from prior holdings. See, e.g., Smith, supra note 23, at 1091-97
("Twombly must be viewed as part of a broader trend in which the Court
recognizes the importance of imposing real and meaningful judicial scrutiny at the
pleading stage, particularly as cases become more costly and complex to litigate.").
207. See Ernest A. Young, Judicial Activism and Conservative Politics, 73
U. COLO. L. REV. 1139, 1144-61 (2002) (describing six broad categories of
activist behavior).
208. See id. at 1141 ( "[W]hile we may plausibly describe different aspects
of judicial acts as either 'activist' or 'restrained,' such terminology will rarely
yield persuasive on-balance characterizations of decisions, much less of particular
judges or courts.") (emphasis added).
209. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Op-Ed., Conservatives Embrace Judicial
Activism in Campaign Finance Ruling, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 22, 2010, available at
http://articles.latimes.com/2010/jan/22/opinion/la-oe-chemerinsky22-2010jan22
(discussing the Supreme Court's recent holding in Citizens United v. Federal
Election Commission and noting that "[t]here is no way to see this other than as the
conservative justices using judicial review to advance the traditional conservative
ideological agenda"); see also Sherrilyn A. Ifill, Judicial Activism from the Right,
THE RooT.COM (Jan. 24, 2010), http://www.theroot.com/views/judicial-activism-
right (noting how the conservative five-justice majority in Citizens United v.
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right is not a new trend;2 10 there have been numerous rulings coming
from the Supreme Court's conservative majority in recent years that
are inconsistent with the view that judicial activism is a tool used
exclusively to advance liberal ideologies.211 Most recently, in
Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission,2 12 the Supreme
Court held that corporations and labor unions are not limited in the
amount of money they can spend on election campaigns.213 The
opinion, authored by Justice Kennedy and joined by Chief Justice
214Roberts and Justices Thomas, Scalia, and Alito, is considered a
strident example of modem judicial activism by many
Federal Election Commission "reversed over 100 years of jurisprudence in which
the court had affirmed Congress' authority to regulate corporate campaign speech,
and directly overturned several key precedents").
210. See Adam Cohen, Editorial, Psst . .. Justice Scalia . . . You Know,
You're an Activist Judge, Too, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 19, 2005, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/04/19/opinion/19tue3.html?_r-1 ("The idea that
liberal judges are advocates and partisans while judges like Justice Scalia are not is
being touted everywhere these days, and it is pure myth. . . . The conservative
partisans leading the war on activist judges are just as inconsistent: they like
judicial activism just fine when it advances their own agendas."); see also Ian
Frederick Finseth, Conservative Judicial Activism, COMMONWEAL INST. (Apr. 21,
2005), http://www.commonwealinstitute.org/archive/conservative-judicial-
activism ("What we've seen in recent years, however, is a sharp rise in
conservative judicial activism, with federal jurists appointed by Republican
Presidents exerting power from the bench much more aggressively.") (emphasis
omitted).
211. See, e.g., Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 100-03 (2000) (finding the
Florida Supreme Court's ballot recounting scheme for the 2000 presidential
election unconstitutional); United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 601, 617-19
(2000) (invalidating the civil damages provisions of the Federal Violence Against
Women Act and holding that Congress may not regulate noneconomic, violent
criminal conduct based solely on that conduct's aggregate effect on interstate
commerce); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 551 (1995) (finding the Gun-
Free School Zones Act of 1990 invalid as exceeding the authority of Congress
under the Commerce Clause); see also Larry D. Kramer, The Supreme Court v.
Balance of Powers, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 3, 2001, at A13 ("For nearly a decade, the
court's five conservative justices have steadily usurped the power to govern by
striking down or weakening federal and state laws regulating issues as varied as
gun sales, the environment and patents .....
212. 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010).
213. Id. at 913-14 (finding that the government is not allowed to suppress
political speech of corporations and that the federal statute prohibiting independent
corporate expenditures for electioneering communications was unconstitutional).
214. Id. at 886. Justice Thomas joined as to all but Part IV, and Justices
Ginsburg, Breyer, Stevens, and Sotomayor joined only as to Part IV.
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commentators,215 who argue that the conservative majority failed to
defer to the elected branches of government by striking down the
McCain-Feingold Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002.216
By downplaying the requirements imposed by Congress
when enacting Rule 8(a)(2), the Supreme Court has managed to
elevate the basic pleading standard for all federal civil cases to
approach the level of the heightened pleading standards of Rule 9(b)
and the PSLRA. These latter provisions were purposefully designed
to be stricter in order to provide adequate notice in cases alleging
fraud, protect the reputation of innocent defendants, and curb
abusive litigation practices (which frequently involve securities fraud
217
claims due to their high nuisance value). Thus, it appears as if the
215. See, e.g., Chemerinsky, supra note 209 (noting that, even though
conservatives have generally argued that judicial restraint entails deference to the
elected branches of government, "[n]o such deference was evident when the
court's five most conservative justices struck down this provision of the McCain-
Feingold law"); Ifill, supra note 209 ("[Citizens United] marks a new level of
brazen determination by the court's conservative majority to reach the conclusions
it wants by any means necessary."); Thomas E. Mann, Commentary: Citizens
United v. FEC Is an Egregious Exercise of Judicial Activism, MCCLATCHY (Jan.
26, 2010), http://www.mcclatchydc.com/opinion/story/82982.html ("In spite of its
imperative to rule on 'cases and controversies' brought to the Court, to defer to the
legitimate lawmaking authority of the Congress and other democratically elected
legislatures, and to not allow simple disagreement with past judicial decisions to
overrule precedent (stare decisis), the Roberts Court ruled unconstitutional the ban
on corporate treasury funding of independent political campaigns.").
216. See Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, H.R. 2356, 107th Cong.
(2002) (amending the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1976, which regulates the
financing of political campaigns).
217. See supra notes 179-88 and accompanying text. Even Congress has
recently taken notice of the Supreme Court's recent redefinition of pleading
doctrines and has begun taking steps to restore the notice pleading standard that
the Court's conservative majority retired through Twombly and Iqbal. Senator
Arlen Specter has introduced a bill into the Senate to reinstate the Conley notice
pleading standard. Titled "Notice Pleading Restoration Act of 2009," the bill
provides:
Except as otherwise expressly provided by an Act of Congress or by an
amendment to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure which takes effect
after the date of enactment of this Act, a Federal court shall not dismiss a
complaint under rule 12(b)(6) or (e) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, except under the standards set forth by the Supreme Court of
the United States in Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957).
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Court, in enhancing the basic Rule 8(a)(2) pleading requirements,
has inappropriately bypassed the proper process for amending the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure because of its concern with abusive
litigation and excessive discovery costs, notwithstanding the fact that
the system already has two heightened pleading standards designed
to address similar issues.218
IV. CONCLUSION
The plausibility pleading standard under Rule 8(a)(2) should
be nowhere near the heightened pleading standards under Rule 9(b)
and the PSLRA. By heightening the basic pleading standard for all
federal civil cases, the Supreme Court has not only made it more
difficult for disgruntled plaintiffs to meet the basic pleading
requirements when bringing forward complex claims,2 19 but has also
introduced a measure of incongruity in a legal system that was based
upon rules that were designed to encourage the resolution of claims
on the merits.220 The way in which these different pleading
standards weigh inferences that are equally consistent with liability
and non-liability may lead to different results for plaintiffs, in a way
that is incongruent with the purpose of the pleading doctrines.
Notice Pleading Restoration Act of 2009, S. 1504, 111th Cong. (2009).
Representative Jerrold Nadler has also introduced a bill to restore the notice
pleading standard that includes specific language from Conley, titled "Open
Access to Courts Act of 2009." Open Access to Courts Act of 2009, H.R. 4115,
111th Cong. (2009). At a hearing before the House Judiciary Committee,
Representative Nadler criticized the decision in Iqbal as being "judicial activism at
its worst." See Atkins, supra note 206.
218. The Twombly decision has also been considered to be motivated by a
desire to reduce tort litigation. See Cavanagh, supra note 126, at 26-27 ("The
solution offered by the majority in Twombly makes little sense unless it had
another goal in mind: tort reform through reduction in the number of private civil
enforcement suits in the federal courts. Tort reform is the unspoken principle at the
heart of the Twombly decision.").
219. See Spencer, supra note 23, at 494 ("Ultimately, Twombly raises the
pleading bar to a point where it will inevitably screen out claims that could have
been proven if given the chance.").
220. See Cavanagh, supra note 126, at 19 ("The goal of the drafters was to
facilitate moving meritorious claims to trial and to make certain that technical rules
of pleading would no longer be a stumbling block for a legitimate claim, as had
been the case under the codes and at common law, where the goal had been to
avoid trial.").
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Moreover, the notion of justice that is the foundation of our legal
system requires that any system of civil litigation provide litigants a
fair opportunity to bring forward meritorious claims without having
to jump through complicated procedural hoops. 22 1 The most basic
pleading standard for all federal civil cases should not converge with
heightened pleading standards that are more stringent due to special
policy concerns.
As observed by Justice Stevens, those complaints that
traditionally failed to provide sufficient notice to a defendant
portrayed the type of "bareness" that the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure were designed to dismiss.222 On the other hand, "[a]
plaintiffs inability to persuade a district court that the allegations
actually included in her complaint are 'plausible' is an altogether
different kind of failing, and one that should not be fatal at the
pleading stage."223 In order to fulfill the policy rationales for which
they were created, the heightened pleading standards under Rule 9(b)
and the PSLRA should be markedly more stringent than the basic
pleading standard under Rule 8(a)(2). It is imperative that
particularity and cogency remain challenging standards to meet;
there should be no doubt as to their stringency. The plausibility
standard, on the other hand, although it is now more onerous to meet
than the previous notice pleading standard, should nonetheless be
focused on its main objectives of providing adequate notice and
serving as a filter for unmeritorious claims, rather than addressing
other policy concerns that would be better handled through the
legislative rulemaking process that created the rules in the first place.
221. See WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 68, § 1202 ("[T]he simplified
pleading standard expressed in [Rule 8(a)(2)] is reinforced by the mandate in Rule
8(f) that 'all pleadings shall be so construed as to do substantial justice."'); see
also Carter, supra note 26, at 25-26 (explaining that one of the purposes of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure was to promote the disposition of cases on the
merits rather than on procedure).
222. Bell Ati. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 580 n.6 (2007) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
223. Id.
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